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DECLARATORY ACTION
By EDWIN BORCHARD *
ONE of the principal purposes of the declaratory action is the removal
of clouds from legal relations. By dissipating peril and insecurity and
thus stabilizing legal relations, it avoids the destruction of the status quo,
and assures a construction or interpretation of the law before rather than
after breach or violence.
The aim of this article is to point out the inadequacies in the existing
methods of challenging statutes, especially police power statutes carrying
a penalty for non-compliance. These methods compel either enforcement
or a threat of enforcement as a condition of adjudication; they fail to
distinguish different types of "criminal" statutes, thus either abusing or
unduly limiting the scope of injunctive relief; and they hamper and impede
a more intelligent method of adjudicating challenges to the constitution-
ality or applicability or construction of so-called "penal" statutes, ordi-
nances and regulations.'
Possibly in no branch of litigation is the declaration more useful than
in the relations between the citizen and the administration. With the
growing complexity of government and the constantly increasing inva-
sions of private liberty, with ever widening powers vested in adminis-
trative boards and officials, the occasions for conflict and dispute are
rapidly augmenting in frequency and importance. Yet the very fact that
such disputes turn mainly upon questions of law, involving the line mark-
ing the boundary between private liberty and public restraint, between
private privilege and immunity, on the one hand, and public right and
power, on the other, makes this field of controversy peculiarly susceptible
to the expeditious and pacifying ministrations of the declaratory judg-
ment.
It is manifest that when the cumbersome and technical writs of cer-
tiorari, injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, prohibi-
tion, are directed against public bodies and officials, what is really sought
is an adjudication on the law, establishing and determining their powers
*Hotchldss Professor of Law, Yale Law School
1. See Comment (1943) 43 Con. L. REv. 213.
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and privileges. Yet under the antiquated common law notion that courts
exist only for purposes of compulsion and condemnation, disputes as to
legal rights had perforce to be framed in the guise of combats looking
to coercion of the defendant. The technicalities with which the law and
its practitioners traditionally endow its instrumentalities have encrusted
these extraordinary remedies for controlling the administration with a
mass of procedural refinements alien to their original purpose and crip-
pling to their efficiency for a twentieth century society; hence, a citizen
seeking a declaration of the illegality of an administrative act often finds
himself enmeshed in the intricacies of certiorari, injunction, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus, or prohibition, and may never reach the
substantive goal he has in view. At all events, he has often been forced
into a mystic maze, whereas he wished merely to ascertain whether the
regulation or order served upon him, or to which he had been subjected,
was valid or not, or, if valid, what it meant.
The imposition of governmental requirements as a condition of the
exercise of private rights, such as engaging in business, erecting build-
ings, or using public facilities, is an inherent element of modern govern-
ment. Such requirements are frequently accompanied by the sanction of
a criminal penalty for violation. But in a constitutional government only
legal demands need to be obeyed, and the question arises whether the
legality of the particular requirement can be put to the test in advance of
enforcement or only after it has been imposed and observed, or, in
event of refusal to obey, only on the suit for a criminal penalty. Speed
is here a factor, and it is a sound view that the administration should not
be unduly hampered by the courts in the enforcement of its demands.
By the construction placed upon declaratory actions in many jurisdic-
tions the individual, threatened by the imposition of governmental de-
mands and requirements, such as license, fee, tax, or police-power restric-
tion, may put to the test the legality of the restriction without risking
the penalties of disobedience or the hazards and expense of injunction.
Thus businessmen, notified to change their methods of doing business and
threatened with a criminal penalty for violation, have claimed a declaration
of their privilege to conduct their business free from the requirement and
penalty and have obtained a conclusive construction of the administrative
order before changing the status quo, without chancing the risks and pre-
carious outcome of a bill of injunction.
"CASE" OR "CONTROVERSY"
After the Anway case in Michigan 2 went off on the false theory that
the power to render declaratory judgments empowered the court to give
advisory opinions, the statutes of several states were supplied with the
2. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1920).
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introductory phrase "in cases of actual controversy" or "actual antagon-
istic assertion and denial of right." a Besides emphasizing the controver-
sial character of justiciable issues, this phrase indicated that no physical
wrong or even threatened wrong was required to make an issue justicia-
ble, and the United States Supreme Court has su construed the term
"cases of actual controversy" in the Federal Act.
The Supreme Court, in its most elaborate analysis of this suppused
limitation on federal jurisdiction, has remarked that the term "cases of
actual controversy" is designed to preserve constitutional requirements;
that the word "actual" is one of "emphasis rather than of definition";
and that "controversy" contemplates a "justiciable controversy," hence
"appropriate for judicial determination," and is thus "distinguished from
a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character, [that is,]
from one that is academic or moot." The controversy must be "definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests." It must be a "real and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts." The Supreme Court then held that there was an actual con-
troversy in the claim of an insurance company against the insured for a
declaration that: in fact the insured was not at a certain date totally dis-
abled as he claimed to be; he was not therefore relieved of the obligation
to pay premiums; the company was privileged to consider the policies as
lapsed for non-payment; it was under no duty to continue the policies
in force or to pay disability benefits except to the amount of the $45 which
the company conceded; the company was not obliged to wait until the
insured or his beneficiary got ready to sue, perhaps years hence, for in the
meantime witnesses would be dispersed and the company would be obliged
to maintain reserves. Since the insured would have had an action against
the company to maintain the policies in force or to sue for disability
benefits, the Supreme Court considered that the issue was not less jus-
ticiable because the company initiated the suit. "The character of the
controversy . . . is essentially the same whether it is presented by the
insured or by the insurer. . . . It is the nature of the controversy, not
the method of its presentation or the particular party who presents it,
that is determinative." 4
Naturally this important decision did not purport to indicate all the
types of cases which are appropriate to adjudication by declaratory action.
There was in the case some evidence, a fact not noticed or in any way
3. California, Hawaii, Kansas, Virginia. Later the clause was prefixed to the
amended Michigan and the federal statute. See BORCHARtD, DEcLirmo " JUnDnTS
(2d ed. 1941) 40.
4. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 239 el seq. (1937) and cases
cited therein; Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S. 288, 325 (1936).
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material to the decision, of a pre-trial antagonistic assertion of right or
claim between the parties, so that the "innovation" merely consisted in
allowing the debtor or party charged to initiate the action against the
creditor or claimant for a declaration of non-liability or immunity. It is
hardly doubtful that the Court would have sustained the propriety of the
action even though the policy-holder had before trial made no answer to
the company's contention and offer--or they to his-since his interest
with respect to all the claims advanced by the company was manifestly
adverse. It has now become common for an insurance company to seek
a declaration of immunity, on the ground of non-coverage or breach of
covenant, from the obligation to defend the insured or pay any eventual
judgment the injured person may recover against the insured.' No cor-
respondence, no assumption of adverse position prior to the service of
the pleadings is necessary, since the contract or statute determines the
legal relations of the parties. Different is the case of the infringer's or
alleged infringer's suit disclaiming infringement or contesting the valid-
ity of the patent, since his power to initiate an action necessarily depends
upon a patentee's prior claim of infringement.6
In the leading case of Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. v.
Wallace,' the Court took occasion to overrule the muddled dicta of earlier
opinions 8 and made for the first time a considered analysis of a declara-
tory judgment, concluding in that case that a declaratory action was
proper to claim exemption on federal constitutional grounds from a Ten-
nessee tax statute. The Court pointed out-a matter which will be em-
phasized in this article-that the conditions precedent to an injunction
are by no means necessary to a justiciable controversy looking to a declara-
tory judgment. Said Justice Stone for a unanimous Court:
"As the prayer for relief by injunction is not a necessary prerequi-
site to the exercise of judicial power, allegations of threatened irre-
parable injury which are material only if an injunction is asked,
may likewise be dispensed with if, in other respects, the controversy
presented is, as in this case, real and substantial." 9
5. See BORCHARD, op. cit. vupra note 3, at 645 et seq.
6. See Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. American Anode, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 921 (D.
Del. 1942), and BORCHARD, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 807.
7. 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
8. Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469 (1930); Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274 (1928); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Coop. Marketing Ass'n, 276 U. S. 71 (1928) ; Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927).
9. 288 U. S. at 264. It has become common practice to issue declarations, while denying
injunctions, whether especially requested or not. Cf. New York & Porto Rico Steamship
Co. v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 538 (E. D. N. Y. 1940); Gully v. Interstate Natural
Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 688 (1936) ; Black
v. Little, 8 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. Mich. 1934) ; BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 428,
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The Court reiterated its earlier conclusion that process of execution is not
an indispensable adjunct of a judgment or of judicial power, but rather
that adjudication or determination of contested issues between adverse
parties is the essence of the judicial function.
There remains, then, in each case only the duty of determining whether
the facts of the case present the conditions of justiciability, conditions
which have been given a constitutional importance by identifying them
with the elements supposedly inherent in the broad term "cases" or "con-
troversies" of Article III of the Federal Constitution.
Here there is still a certain opportunity for narrowness of construction,
subconsciously derived from the Supreme Court's disposition to avoid the
decision of cases involving constitutional questions, a purpose which in-
duces excessively strict requirements for justiciability. While thus hav-
ing its origin in the desire to avoid the decision of constitutional issues,
the federal tests of justiciability have inevitably exerted a restrictive influ-
ence in cases other than constitutional " and in courts other than feder-
al. 1 While courts in other English-speaking countries, and particularly
federal courts, are equally alert to avoid decisions in the abstract,' - it is
10. For example, in patent cases, where both validity and infringement are in issue,
the decision must rest on the narrower ground of infringement where possible, not the
broader ground of validity. Where judgment in a patent suit holds the patent valid but
not infringed, the issue of validity is wrongly, it is submitted, considered moot, the suc-
cessful defendant, alleged infringer, being allowed to appeal on the issue of validity only
for the purpose of having it struck from the findings. See Electrical Fittings Corp. v.
Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939), and criticism in BoncnArn, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 815. Actually, but not admittedly, this rule seems to be modified by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Altvater v. Freeman, 63 Sup. Ct. 1115, decided May
24, 1943. Because the licensee-infringer pleaded a counterclaim challenging the validity
of the patent, the dispute on validity, raising issues additional to the limited claims in-
volved in the main suit, was held not to be moot but adjudicable. Perhaps after a while a
counterclaim will be held unnecessary to keep in the case the "raging" issue of validity
of the patent. The dissent by Frankfurter, J., seems to consider the issue of validity
justiciable throughout. Judge Frank in his concurring opinion in Aero Spark Plug
Co. v. B. G. Corp., 130 F. (2d) 290, 292 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), made an able argument
in urging that the court proceed to find invalidity, where thit is possible, since the public
also has an interest in knowing whether a patent is valid or invalid. Yet in Cover v.
Schwartz, 133 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), where the losing plaintiff on appeal
dropped the charge of infringement but concentrated the argument and brief on the central
issue of invalidity, as found by the lower court, the majority of the court, by Franl:, J.,
ruled that there was no longer a "case" or "controversy" and that the plaintiff had thus
deprived the court of all jurisdiction to proceed. See the strong dissenting opinion of
Judge Clark, at 547, which seems sounder. The validity of a written instrument or of
the right claimed under it is one of the commonest subjects of declaratory adjudication.
BORCHARD, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 505, 563, 591, 606, 638, S02.
11. See, e.g.. Dep't of State v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 46 N. E. (2d) 237
(Ind. 1943). See discussion and authorities on hijunciions in 28 Am!. Jun (1940) §233
ct seq.
12. Two such cases, involving the construction of statutes in New Zealand under
Section 3 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, 1903, were New Zealand Educational In-
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believed that numerous courts would have readily found justiciability in
such cases as Newc, Jersey v. Sargent 13 and United States v. West Vir-
ginia,'4 which the United States Supreme Court refused to decide as in-
sufficiently concrete and specific. Courts in those jurisdictions seem to be
less inhibited and display a well-developed sense of the social function of
courts.' 5
stitute v. Wrellington Education Board, [1926] N. Z. 615; Dairy Proprietary Ass'n v.
New Zealand Dairy-Produce Control Board, [1926] N. Z. 535.
13. 269 U. S. 328 (1926). Dismissed because a power license had not yet been issued
on the rivers in question by New Jersey or the Federal Power Commission. How con-
crete the facts must be before adjudication is undertaken is often a question of personal
judgment. The United States Supreme Court is not hospitable to attempts to invoke the
original jurisdiction of the Court.
14. 295 U. S. 463 (1935). This case involved a litigation between the United States
and West Virginia-three private corporations being added defendants-as to which had
jurisdiction to issue power licenses on the New and Kanawha Rivers, West Virginia.
That depended on whether they were navigable streams or not. The United States main-
tained that the dams built under license from the state were an obstruction, which it
sought to enjoin. The aim was to compel the corporations to take out a Federal Power
Commission license. The three corporations successfully moved to dismiss on the ground
of lack of original jurisdiction over them in the United States Supreme Court and the
state. Because the United States did not assert the invasion by this disputed licensing
power of West Virginia of a federal "property right," the Court concluded it had no juris-
diction. In fact, the United States had also built dams on the Kanawha River. Because
it involved "only" a dispute as to which authority had jurisdiction over the rivers-very
acrimonious and pointed up by the three licenses actually issued-the Court thought the
setting too vague for an adjudication, although it is not uncommon in lower courts for
competing authorities to sue each other on the issue as to which had jurisdiction in a
particular case. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939) ; BORCHARD, Op. cit. supra
note 3, at 901, 911, 914. Had United States v. West Virginia arisen where the navigability
was either admitted by the demurrer or actually, though not theoretically, decided in the
United States District Court, with proper citation of the affected power companies, it is
quite possible that the Court would have perceived a justiciable controversy in the dis-
pute between federal and state authority as to which of them had jurisdiction to issue
power licenses on the rivers. Cf. Comment (1943) 56 HARv. L. Ray. 800.
15. The difference in policy is indicated, on the one hand, by Langer v. State, 69
N. D. 129, 284 N. W. 238 (1939), on the other, by Seiz v. Citizens Pure Ice Co., 207
Minn. 277, 290 N. W. 802 (1940). In the former, the State Budget Board obtained a
judgment against numerous departments, boards and commissions of North Dakota de-
claring defendants' disputed statutory duties, the court clarifying the constitutional and
legislative provisions bearing on the subject. The opinion, calling attention to the dis-
tinctions between advisory opinions and declaratory judgments, demonstrates that a con-
test between public officers as to their respective rights and duties or jurisdiction may
with perfect propriety be regarded as justiciable if the court so desires, and that a state
court ought not to withhold from the people on technical grounds such a stabilizing func-
tion. The Kentucky and Tennessee courts have recognized the social importance of this
judicial service. See also the decisions of Canadian and Australian courts on federal
powers in BORCHARD, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 773. In the Sciz case in Minnesota an em-
ployee sued an employer for a declaration that an amendment, depriving the employee
of the protection of unemployment insurance, was unconstitutional. Because plaintiff
was not then unemployed, and because his claim was allegedly against a fund though
actually to establish defendant's duty to continue payment into the fund, the suit was
[Vol. 52: 445
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For these reasons there was at one time some fear that the term "cases
of actual controversy" would be so construed as to demand practically
the equivalent of a threatened wrong and thus impair considerably the
utility of the declaratory judgment. Experience has not justified the fear.
While numerous courts are still suspicious of declaratory procedure, most
courts have carried out the statutes' direction for a liberal construction and
have given the words mentioned the connotation of a bill to remove clouds
from legal relations generally or a bill quia timet, demanding from the de-
fendant, not necessarily a pre-trial dispute of the plaintiff's legal position,
but merely the status of a part), having an interest potentially adverse to the
plaintiff. This interest may be represented by a claim or record which dis-
turbs the title, peace or freedom of the plaintiff, so that any claims, de-
mands, challenges, records, or merely adverse interests which, by casting
doubt, jeopardy, insecurity or uncertainty upon the plaintiff's rights or
status, damage his pecuniary or material interests, establish a cundition of
justiciability.16 This disturbance or unsettlement sometimes requires a sen-
sitive appreciation of what is jeopardy and insecurity and of the source
from which such jeopardy and insecurity may emanate. On the formal
side, all that the courts have asked are the flexible requirements of the Eng-
lish and Scotch law :17
"That the question must be real, and not theoretical; the person
raising it must have a real interest, and there must be some one hav-
ing a real interest in the question who may opp, tse the declaration
sought." 18
dismissed as a "difference of opinion," hypothetical, advisory, abstract, etc. This seems
exceptionally narrow.
16. It had until recently been assumed that an indispensable cvndition of a "case" or
"controversy" was the requisite legal interest in the plaintiff to obtain an adjudication.
This conception is now slightly expanded in that the federal courts have sustained the
power of Congress under various federal statutes to authorize some person or body hav-
ing an economic but not necessarily a legal interest-a "person aggrieved or whose inter-
ests are adversely affected"V-to intervene or prosecute an appeal from the determination
of an administrative commission to the higher federal courts, acting in this respect as a
sort of private Attorney-General to protect the public interest. See the analytical opin-
ion of Frank, J., in Associated Industries of New York State v. Harold Icles, decided
February 8, 1943 (C. C. A. 2d); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Fderal Communica-
tions Commission, 316 U. S. 4 (1942) ; Federal Communicati, ns Ctmmission v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 (1940). In National Broadcasting Co. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 132 F. (2d) 545 (App. D. C. 1942), the words "person
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" were construed to civer private
interests, not necessarily financially impaired but adversely affected through substantital
electrical interference by the grant of a radio license to another station. That they may
intervene as a matter of right was held on appeal, 63 Sup. Ct. 1U35 (U. S. 1943 L,
decided May 17, 1943. For public intervention in the public interest, see Securities and
Exchange Comm'n v. U. S. Realty Co., 310 U. S. 434 (1940).
17. See Boacn Arx, op. cit. supra note 3, at 160; Russian Commercial & Industrial
Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade, [1921] 2 A. C. 438.
18. See Miller v. Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 487, 261 S. V. 965, 972 (1924).
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In fact, where the action is designed to dissipate the uncertainty or
assure the validity of the plaintiff owner's or lessor's title, the defendant
purchaser or lessee may have only a potential but not an actual adverse
interest; 19 yet the appearance of adversity in litigation and presentation
of opposing views suffices to establish justiciability. Even a default judg-
ment should be granted if the court is convinced that it has all the facts
and that the adjudication will serve a useful purpose. Section 6 of the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides that the decision must
"terminate the uncertainty or controversy" giving rise to the proceedings.
While not all courts have been equally receptive or hospitable to the
social advantages of preventive justice afforded by the declaratory pro-
cedure,2" few courts in fact have limited the utility of the statute by con-
struing narrowly the phrase "in cases of actual controversy." It has been
done on a few occasions," and there is always the danger that the full
potentialities of the Act will be impaired by limitations judicially injected
into the phrase. There is always the danger that in actions begun by the
party charged the court will demand from the defendant more than a
potentially antagonistic position or interest, insisting an actual threat,
as if injunction were sought.22 This danger is most noticeable in a chal-
19. See In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
20. Some, like Maryland and Pennsylvania, misconstrue the Act as if it provided
an exclusive remedy only, not to be used in the alternative where another remedy could
have been brought. See BORCHARD, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 318 et scq.
21. The impropriety of a demand that "controversy" precede the litigation and that
potential adversity of interest is not sufficient to create justiciability is indicated by Di
Fabio v. Southard, 106 N. J. Eq. 157, 150 Att. 248 (1930); Wardrop Co. v. Fairfield
Gardens, 237 App. Div. 605, 262 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1st Dep't 1933) ; and, in part, Lyman v.
Lyman, 293 Pa. 490, 143 Atl. 200 (1928), discussed by John A. Schroth, Jr., in (1935)
20 CORN. L. Q. 1, 21-25. Most of the cases have not construed "actual controversy" in this
narrow sense. In actions to remove clouds from title and now from legal relations more
generally, courts have conceded that the potential controversy is, after litigation com-
mences, an actual controversy if the party in peril or insecurity cites a defendant having
adverse interests for a declaration of the invalidity of the cloud. See Fidelity National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 131 (1927). Bond validation statutes and deci-
sions are a familiar example. See BORCHARD, op. cit supra note 3, at 145.47. Justice Stone
supplied a useful test in the Swope case-and Chief Justice Hughes in the Haworth case
-by concluding that since it would undoubtedly be a case or controversy if the defendant
had sued for a declaration or injunction, "they cannot be deemed any the less so because
through a modified procedure the parties are reversed and the same issues are raised
and finally determined at the behest of the city." In this statement the Court would
doubtless support the initiative of any party in peril or insecurity who might have been
made a defendant in a reverse action. The controversy at the trial is usually clear and
is more than an adequate compliance with the conditions of justiciability.
22. That the United States Supreme Court has advanced beyond this point is indicated
in the Swope and Haworth cases, supra. Even in some of the constitutional challenges
to the enforcement of statutes a "threat" is little more than constructive and not really
present. See Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 312 U. S. 45 (1941) ; Currin v. Wallace,
19 F. Supp. 211 (E. D. N. C. 1937), 95 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), 306 U. S. 1
(1939). See also Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 7 N. W. (2d) 438 (N. D. 1943).
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lenge to the constitutionality or construction of statutes, particularly stat-
utes or ordinances carrying a penalty, where the law has by loose interpre-
tation gotten into a position no longer responsive to private and public
needs.
CHALLENGING STATUTES
Section 2 of the Uniform Declaratory judgments Act provides that
"any person . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected
by a statute, municipal ordinance . . . may have determined any question
of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance...
and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations there-
under." 23
In English-speaking jurisdictions, Acts of Parliament and local laws,
ever since Sir George Turner's Act of 1850, have been the subject of
declaratory construction and interpretation."'4 Section 3 of the New Zea-
land Declaratory judgments Act expressly provides what is implied in
other jurisdictions:
"Where any person has done or desires to do any act the validity,
legality, or effect of which depends on the construction or validity
of any statute, or any regulation made by the Governor-General in
Council under statutory authority, or any by-law made by a local
authority . . . such person may apply to the Supreme Court by orig-
inating summons . . . for a declaratory order determining any ques-
tion as to the construction or validity of such statute, regulation,
by-law . . . or of any part thereof." 25
As stated in Harcourt v. Attorney-General:
"The Declaratory Judgments Act . . . is a statute which author-
izes His Majesty's subjects to ascertain by an authoritative pro-
nouncement the precise meaning of the law they are called upon to
obey." 26
That the United States Supreme Court is not oblivious to the social ad-
vantage of adjudication before violation is indicated by the remark of
Justice Butler in Terrace v. Thompson:
23. Section 11 of the Uniform Act provides that in any such proceeding vhere the
statute or ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney-General of the state
shall also be served with a copy of the proceedings and be entitled to be heard. This
anticipated the provisions of the Federal Act of 1937 as to federal statutes.
24. See BoRcHA-p, op. cit. mupra note 3, at 764.
25. Id. at 1050. The act or proposed act to be passed upon must be in actual cifn-
templation, not hypothetical. See Parapara Iroft-Ore Co. Y. Barnett, [1913] N. Z. 1112.
The usual conditions of justiciability must be present. See cases cited supra note 12.
26. [1923] N. Z. 686 at 690.
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"They are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines and
imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudica-
tion of their rights." 27
In the twentieth century, with its kaleidoscopic changes and the result-
ing necessity of new legislation and regulation to maintain the social
equilibrium, much of it carrying a criminal penalty, there has been a
special need for a speedy determination of the constitutionality and con-
struction of legislation and regulations imposing burdens on the individual.
Some of these relate to public duties required of all or of a class of citi-
zens; others relate to individual burdens. To make it, as our courts gen-
erally do in these cases,2" a condition of justiciability, that the affected
group or individual await a threat of the District Attorney or the Attor-
ney-General to enforce the statute or regulation before challenging the
legality or applicability of the statutory burden, overlooks the fact that
the injury is done, in most cases, by the enactment of the damaging stat-
ute or regulation, long before or even quite without any "threat" of en-
forcement by an official. Justiciability or the right to initiate an action-
in British jurisdictions by "originating summons"-is created by the
jeopardy or restriction placed by the statute upon the plaintiff's freedom
of action. The statute or regulation now constitutes the cloud which
plaintiff has the right to challenge and, if successful, to remove.
In spite of the circuity of the rationalization in Ex parte Young,2" it
matters or should matter not in the slightest what the District Attorney
thinks about the statute-whether he likes it or not, whether he intends to
enforce it or not, whether he threatens or not. The fear, jeopardy, dan-
ger and insecurity are created by the statute, not by the District Attorney.
A statute is supposed to be enforced by the enforcing officer; if he fails
to do so, he is derelict in his duty. If he is summoned as a defendant
by a complaining petitioner, it may be assumed that he will defend the
statute or assign the defense to some officer who will support it. It is not
27. 263 U. S. 197, 216 (1923). This was an injunction restraining enforcement against
plaintiff, proposing to enter upon a lease of land to a Japanese, of a Washington state
prohibition under penalty to transfer agricultural land to a person ineligible for citizen-
ship. See also Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 726, 291 N. W. 62, 64 (1940) (claimed
privilege to conduct Spiritualist seances as not constituting a public exhibition for gain) :
"Plaintiffs, seeking a declaratory judgment, are not required in advance to violate a
penal statute as a condition of having it construed or its validity determined." Cf. Sage-
Allen Co., Inc. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 673, 179 AtI. 195, 197 (1935): "Certainly
these plaintiffs may justly claim that the court should declare whether or not the regu-
lation is valid that they may, without actually violating it, be authoritatively apprised
of their rights."
28. Tileston v. Ullman, 63 Sup. Ct. 493 (U. S. 1943) ; Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387
(1941) ; Ex parte La Prade, 289 U. S. 444 (1933) ; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis,
273 U. S. 70 (1927) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
29. 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
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his function to review the conclusion of the legislature and the Governor
as to the constitutionality of the statute. The injured or jeopardized citi-
zen should not be obliged to wait upon the whims of a District Attorney
until he makes up his mind and announces his determination as to whether
or not he will enforce the law. Yet the United States Supreme Court may
be forcing this conclusion upon the country and frustrating preventive
relief both by raising high the barriers to injunction and by insisting on a
personal threat of the Attorney-General."
The assumption made in Ex parte La Prade "' that since, under the Ex
parte Young doctrine, the suit is brought against the defendant not as an
Attorney-General but as an individual, he, and his successor, must, before
suit is justified, make up his mind whether the statute is constitutional and
whether he will enforce it, seems utterly unsustainable. The mistakes
of Ex parte Young should be extinguished, not perpetuated. Law en-
forcement may by dereliction or hesitation become lax, with resulting
responsibility to the government and the people as a whole; but the in-
jured or jeopardized citizen should not be obliged to change his mode of
life or livelihood in fear of criminal prosecution without opportunity to
challenge the damaging statute until the District Attorney chooses to
"threaten" him with enforcement.
The awkwardness of the requirement that the Attorney-General must
"threaten" is illustrated by the recent case of Soulhern Pacific Company
v. Conwayv . There the company had challenged in a federal court the
constitutionality of an Arizona Train Limit statute, much like that in the
La Prade case," which limited freight trains to ninety cars and passenger
trains to fourteen. Conformity with the statute required an expenditure
of at least $300,000 a year. The penalty for non-conformity would have
cost the railroad cumulative penalties of $1,600 to $37,000 per day,
depending on the density of traffic. Since the Attorney-General was given
the mandatory duty to enforce the statute, he was made the defendant.
He informed the court, however, that there had been as yet no violation,
that he did not know whether he would enforce the law or not, and that
he had made no threat of enforcement. In spite of the mandatory word-
ing of the statute, he insisted that since he had not determined upon its
constitutionality he was under no duty to enforce it. The lower court,
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals, dismissed the suit, although the
30. See Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941). Black, J., went even further in
demanding that the threat relate to the particular provision of the statute under chal-
lenge. What was said concerning the power of equity to enjoin enforcement of a "crim-
inal" statute, confining it to "exceptional circumstances" and where "the danger of ir-
reparable loss is both great and immediate" must be read in the light of the fact that a
federal injunction against a state statute was sought.
31. 289 U. S. 444 (1933).
32. 115 F. (2d) 746 (C. C A. 9th, 1940).
33. 289 U. S. 444 (1933).
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Attorney-General after the first judgment actually prosecuted the South-
ern Pacific under the law in two state cases. While the circuit court of
appeals conceded that justiciability was thereupon created, amendment to
the complaint or a remand to the district court was not allowed, but in-
stead a dismissal ordered, requiring a new action. The court relied upon
Ex parte La Prade, which considered the issue as personal to the Attorney-
General, and therefore demanded a personal threat. 4
Yet, in Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,5  in which a federal
injunction was sought to prevent state criminal prosecution of the rail-
road's alleged violation of the Nebraska Full Train Crew law, the Attor-
ney-General had merely stated that if he thought it "necessary and proper
to do so" he would cause a single test suit to be instituted in the state
courts for one alleged violation. Justiciability was not questioned, but
the federal court declined to exercise its equitable power unless the pros-
pective damage to the railroad was irreparable-which was not shown,
though alleged. It was not a lack of justiciability nor even an unwilling-
ness to enjoin a criminal prosecution, but the undesirability, except in
extreme cases, of a federal injunction against the exercise of state juris-
diction which motivated the policy. 6 Only by a similarly reasoned self-
restraint could the Conway decision have been justified,3" although the
obligations and the penalties in the Arizona case were so heavy and cumu-
lative, even before judgment, that the injury might well have been con-
sidered irreparable.
POLICE POWER STATUTES AND JUSTICIABILITY
Ve do not now address ourselves to statutes or ordinances providing
an amendment, revision or reorganization of governmental or public pow-
ers or duties. Such statutes have frequently been placed in issue by the
enacting and challenged public authority itself, by the Attorney-General,
34. See Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1278, 1280. The current Supreme Court seems to
insist on a personal threat as indispensable to justiciability. See Watson v. Buck, 313
U. S. 387 (1941). But in that case they permitted the substitution of two successor
Attorneys-General on motion, saying nothing about Ex parte La Prade.
35. 312 U. S. 45 (1941).
36. The same indisposition to permit federal injunctions against the enforcement of
state statutes is manifested in Marsh v. Buck, 313 U. S. 406, 136 A. L. R. 1426, 1438
(1941); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941). See also Injunctions in 28 AM. Jun.
(1940) § 237.
37. In Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 168, 287
N. Y. Supp. 288, 294 (1st Dep't 1936), the court stated: "The mere continued existence
of Article 88 under the color of right and authority constitutes a continuing threat to
collect, exact and enforce the tax." Cf. Chester T. Fosgate Co. v. Kirkland, 19 F. Supp.
152 (S. D. Fla. 1937); Crockett County v. Walters, 170 Tenn. 337, 95 S.W. (2d) 305
(1936) ; Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P. (2d) 341 (1937). See also
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510 (1925).
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by an officer affected by the act, by a governmental unit challenging a
redistribution of public powers or burdens, by a private corporation or
individual deleteriously affected, and on occasion by a taxpayer whose
interest is either proved or assumed.s
We are here concerned with statutes under the police power addressed
to or aimed at a particular class of individuals or corporations engaged
in a specific business or to a group in which the plaintiff is ostensibly or
actually included. The statute, therefore, directly impinges upon the plain-
tiff's freedom of action, requiring him under penalty to change his busi-
ness practices or restricting him from doing what he claims a constitu-
tional privilege to do without restraint. Where the statute merely author-
izes an administrative body or commission to select the subject of its inhi-
bitions, the affected individual may before challenge have to await admin-
istrative action, depending upon the nature of the statute. The result is
the same. Such statutes may:
(1) strike very directly at the affected plaintiff, e.g., where dentists
are prohibited from advertising and plaintiff is a disgruntled dentist chal-
lenging the restriction; "
(2) strike more indirectly, by draving the circle of prohibition so
widely as to include plaintiffs who ought or claim they ought on constitu-
tional grounds to have been excluded; (Examples of this kind are statutes,
ordinances or regulations prohibiting the giving of all contraceptive ad-
vice, and making no exception for physicians advising married women
whose lives are in danger; 40 prohibiting all sales of stock on margin,
even in furtherance of non-gambling, valid business transactions; "I re-
quiring all tin containers to be stamped, and making no exception for cans
already packed ;12 prohibiting zoning ordinances and allowing for no ex-
ceptions in cases of special hardship.)1 3
38. See BocifARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 877 et seq.
39. See Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental E-aminers, 148 Ore. 50, 34 P.
(2d) 311 (1934), aff'd, 294 U. S. 608 (1935) (dentists); Sage-Alen Co. v. Wheeler,
119 Conn. 667, 179 At. 195 (1935) (optometrists; state board); Shelton v. Cit" of
Shelton, 111 Conn. 433, 150 At. 811 (1930) (milk dealers); Howard Co. v. Xevw Jer-
sey State Board of Optometrists, 29 A. (2d) 742 (N. J. Eq. 1943) (advertising; injunc-
tion granted against revoking license for noncompliance); Erwin Billiard Parlor v.
Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. NV. 565 (1927) (pool rooms restricted in one county
only).
40. See Tileston v. Ullman, 63 Sup. Ct. 493 (U. S. 1943). Cf. Jacobson v. Ma5sa-
chusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905). See Comment on Tilcston decision in (1943) 16 So. Caur.
L. Rnv. 224. See also Martin v. City of Struthers, 63 Sup. Ct. 802, 867 (U. S. 1943)
(prohibiting ringing of door bells and summoning inmates, but making no exception fLor
distribution of religious literature). See also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 63 Sup. Ct.
870, 872 (U. S. 1943) (prohibiting canvassing and soliciting without a license, but making
no exception for religious literature).
41. See Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606 (1903).
42. See Polk Co. v. Glover, County, Solicitor, 305 U. S. 5 (193S).
43. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 13 (1928).
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(3) draw the circle of statutory or administrative prohibition so small
that it constitutes discrimination against a special class of individuals,
each of whom may complain; (An ordinance closing laundries during cer-
tain hours applied only to Chinese laundries ", and restrictions as to
hours of labor in certain industries only, where it is claimed there is no
basis for the classification ", belong in this category.)
(4) purport to cure an evil, which is conceded, but the challenge is
directed to the appropriateness of the statutory cure, as in sterilization
statutes 4 and other deprivations of civil liberties ;41 (Such statutes cannot
be challenged until there is an attempted enforcement against a particular
victim.)
(5) prohibit or require a specific practice and the affected plaintiff
claims that the requirement is unconstitutional ;"8 [This case is somewhat
analogous to those described under (1).]
(6) prohibit a general practice, but as a matter of statutory construc-
tion the affected plaintiff claims that his special practice does not fall
within the general terms or that it is privileged; (Thus the validity or in-
validity of the practice as a matter of statutory construction is placed in
issue.) 49
These constitute some of the principal types of police power regulations
which an affected victim may challenge. We shall now see how it came
44. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886). Cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U. S. 569 (1941); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165 (1923).
45. See Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292 (1924). Cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S.
141 (1940) (exempting agricultural producers from anti-trust law).
46. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, Attorney-General, 316 U. S. 535
(1942) ; Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927) ; (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1380.
47. See Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U. S. 53 (1940) ; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,
278 U. S. 105 (1928) ; cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), and cases cited at
98; Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928).
48. See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940), overruled in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 11 U. S. L. WEEK 4472 (U. S.
1943) (flag salute) ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 9 (1939) (tobacco auctioning regula-
tions) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936) (circulation tax) ; Hamil-
ton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934) (military training) ;
State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928) (publicity to
secret societies) ; Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) (teaching foreign
languages in private schools prohibited).
49. See Dep't of State v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 46 N. E. (2d) 237 (Ind.
1943) (that plaintiff's vitamin tablets are not "drugs" but "foods"); State ex Yel. Public
Service Comm. v. Blair, 140 S. W. (2d) 865 (Mo. 1941) (that plaintiffs, as contract
carriers, were exempt from the jurisdiction of the Commission) ; Chung Mee Restaurant
Co. v. Healy, 86 N. H. 483, 171 AtI. 263 (1934) (that plaintiff's method of conducting
a dance floor without license was lawful within meaning of statute) ; Multnomah County
Fair Ass'n v. Langley, 140 Ore. 172, 13 P. (2d) 354 (1932) (that plaintiff's method of
conducting horse races was lawful under the statute) ; Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men
v. Bar Ass'n of City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937) (that plaintiff's
system of collecting accounts was legitimate and not practicing law contrary to statute).
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about that a threat to enforce the regulation, rather than the enactment
of it, is required as a condition of justiciability.
THE ASSUMED REQUIREMENT OF OFFICL,%. "THREAT"
Our law has worked itself through several stages into the awkward and
false position of requiring a preliminary personal "threat" as a conditiun
of justiciability. It has done this:
(1) by assuming that injunction was the only vehicle of preventive
relief, and then abusing the injunction to grant a declaration, to the con-
fusion of both;
(2) by considering a personal threat the only condition of an injunc-
tion, whereas threat is only one species of the genus "jeopardy";
(3) by rationalizing, in Ex parte Young, an involved and untenable
reconciliation between a suit against the state under the Eleventh Amend-
ment and a suit-if the statute is ultimately found unconstitutional-
against a supposedly tort-feasing Attorney-General, stripped of his official
protection, under the Fourteenth;
(4) by creating the requirement, in Ex parte La Prade, that when the
Attorney-General retires for any reason, his successor must personally
renew the original threat in order to permit a suit to continue--a de-
plorable rule perpetuated in Federal Rule 25 (d) ;
(5) by considering every police power statute or regulation sanc-
tioned by a penalty as a "criminal" statute and by failing to distinguish in
matters of construction between nzahn in sC and zahtni prohibitum;
(6) by granting or refusing, haphazardly, without clear criteria (a)
injunctions against enforcement of "criminal" statutes or (b) declara-
tions of their constitutionality or construction.
INJUNCTION AS A VEHICLE OF ADJUDICATION
It is commonly assumed that short of a criminal prosecution by public
authority " the affected individual's only method of testing the constitu-
tionality or construction of a statute is by writ of injunction to prevent
enforcement. The utmost confusion prevails in the application of accepted
conceptual standards because of traditionally rigid views as to what is a
"criminal" statute or regulation, as to when equity may or should antici-
pate or impede the enforcement of the "criminal" law, and as to whether
the conditions of an injunction, imminent and irreparable injury and in-
adequacy of legal remedy, are indispensable conditions or merely dispen-
sable slogans designed to afford plaintiff a vehicle for adjudication. The
effort to do justice in particular cases has produced frequent relaxation
50. The Government may also be authorized by special statute to proceed by injunc-
tion to restrain the private offense or to sue for civil penalties. Cf. Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §41 (1940), and Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ments of 1938, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. §41 (1940).
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in the application of these maxims, so that the construction of most of
their elements has been qualified and therefore left uncertain. The Su-
preme Court on several occasions has made the statement that "equity
jurisdiction may be invoked when it is essential to the protection of the
rights asserted, even though the complainant seeks to enjoin the bringing
of criminal actions." "' In later cases, however, the Court has insisted
not only on allegations of unconstitutionality but also on "exceptional
circumstances," "great and immediate danger of irreparable loss," 62
which, strictly construed, could bar an injunction in many cases and com-
pel a criminal prosecution as the only vehicle of adjudication. This posi-
tion must be justified on the balancing of interests in particular cases-
the importance of the private need for the precise construction of the
statutory requirement against the importance of the public interest in a
criminal prosecution, functionally speaking.
Similar considerations have induced a willingness to observe a vague
distinction between statutes which directly impose tinder penalty an obli-
gation or prohibition and statutes which merely authorize an adminis-
trative commission to make or enforce regulations with penal sanctions
by denominating the latter as "quasi-criminal" statutes " and thereby
opening the equitable channel, by injunction or declaratory action, to their
construction and interpretation. Even as to general statutes carrying a
penalty, the courts have invented a number of exceptions to the maxim
of equitable impotence to enjoin criminal prosecutions by invoking, on
a charge of unconstitutionality, the concept of immediately impending
irreparable injury to property 54 or the person," the danger of a multi-
51. See Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. R., 305 U. S. 177, at 183 (1938); Utah
Fuel Co. v. National Bituminous Coal Commission, 306 U. S. 56, 59 (1939); Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214 (1923) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37, 38 (1915)
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 621 (1912).
52. Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941). Opinion by Black, J., who had dissented
in Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U. S. 66, at 79 (1939), and in effect induced a change in the policy
of the Court which may greatly limit the power to challenge by injunction in the federaf
courts perhaps any statute, but particularly a state statute. The statute was a Florida
Act prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade. That may have been a subconscious
operative factor. But the court has shown little awareness in this respect of any difference
among types of statutes carrying a criminal penalty. See the cases cited in Douglas v.
City of Jeannette, 63 Sup. Ct. 877, 881, decided May 3, 1943, where there occurs the
remark: "The lawfulness or constitutionality of the statute . . . may be determined
as readily in the [pending state] criminal case as in a [federal] suit for an injunction."
Since the Court found the bill to be without equity, injunction was properly denied, but
it would be unfortunate to convey the impression that the Court prefers a criminal over
a civil proceeding in a matter involving merely constitutionality or statutory construction.
This close limitation on injunctions seems bound to influence state courts.-
53. See Note (1943) 43 COL. L. REV. 213.
54. See Salny, Equity Jurisdiction to Enjoin Statutory Enforcement (1939) 8 MAss.
L. Soc. 3. 398; (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 560; (1935) 13 NED. L. BULL. 406; (1940) 28 Am,
JUR. § 233 et seq.
55. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923); American Steel & Wire Co.
v. Davis, 261 Fed. 800 (D. Ohio 1919) ; Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal
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plicity of vexatious prosecutions '6 or the cumulation of severe penaltiesYT
In the determination of the circumstances under which these conditions
prevail, and as to what actually is "irreparable injury," 11 the courts have
a wide latitude, so that the injunction process may almost be said to be
subjectively discretionary, albeit subject to a few rules. Where police
action or a criminal proceeding is pending or in the offing, whtre the
offense involves moral turpitude or criminal intent, where the accused
seems plausibly guilty, where the issue of constitutionality or construc-
tion turns not on questions of law or simple facts but on complicated or
seriously disputed questions of fact, a court may and generally does re-
frain from exerting its equitable jurisdiction and considers a criminal
trial preferable. 9 A balance of considerations necessarily dictates the
preference.
The suggestion that the opportunity of becoming a defendant in a
criminal trial is an adequate remedy at law and thus a bar to a bill of
injunction is either not advanced at all or, where it is advanced, seems
discreditable to the court."0 The liability to be tried as a criminal is no
"remedy" but a hazard, which the law should help the much regimented
citizen to avoid by construing and interpreting inhibitory statutes in a
civil proceeding where possible. 1 Evidence of this fact may be observed
Rights (1923) 33 YAia L. J. 115; Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1920 (1921)
34 HARv. L. Rxvi 388, 407.
56. See 'Mobile v. Orr, 181 Ala. 308, 61 So. 920 (1913) ; Foley v. Ham, 102 Kan. 65,
169 Pac. 183 (1917); (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 204.
57. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). Cf. Comment (1928) 26 Mixc.
L. REv. 415. See also Derby Oil Co. v. City of Oxford, 134 Kan. 59, 4 P. (2d) 435
(1931), noted in (1932) 45 HAav. L. REv. 741 (estoppel).
58. See Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 255. In the following cases the United States
Supreme Court declined to pass on the constitutionality of legislation on petition for
injunction on the ground that irreparable injury was not shown: Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 63 Sup. Ct. 877 (U. S. 1943) (license tax on distribution of religious literature);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941) (copyright combination) ; Beal v. Missouri Pa-
cific R. R., 312 U. S. 45 (1941) (Full Train Crew Law plus federal self-restraint
against injunction of state proceeding) ; Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosseup, 298 U. S.
226 (1936) (liquor license law) ; Moor v. Texas & New Orleans R. R., 297 U. S. 101
(1936) (Cotton Control Act); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1935)
(_National Industrial Recovery Act).
59. See cases cited supra notes 52 and 54, and in Comment (1937) 46 Y,%X. L J. 855.
60. See Bookbinder's Trade Ass'n v. Book Manufacturers Institute, 7 F. Supp. 847
(S. D. N. Y. 1934), (1935) 3 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 248; Royal Farms Dairy v. Wallace,
7 F. Supp. 560 (D. Md. 1934) ; Shredded Vheat Co. v. City of Elgin, 284 Ill. 389, 120
N. E. 248 (1918), criticized in BoRcH.ARh, op. cit. supra note 3, at 967; Stewart v. Her-
ten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. IV. 552 (1933), an unsound decision.
61. See remarks of Desmond, J., in New York Foreign Trade Zone Oplrators v.
State Liquor Authority, 285 N. Y. 272, 34 N. E. (2d) 316 (1941). Cf., however, with
great respect to the distinguished writing justice, the rather callous position of the Su-
preme Court with that of the English Court of Appeal. Supreme Court: "No citizen
or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged
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in those cases which regard the impending commencement of a suit by
the Attorney-General as a sufficient ground for the issuance of an in-
junction, where there is an allegation, plausibly supported, that the gov-
erning statute or regulation is unconstitutional. 2
The fact should not be overlooked that the sanctions of the criminal
law are not the only ones available to an administration in enforcing
police power statutes and regulations. Administrative tribunals, civil pro-
ceedings for injunction, forfeiture or penalty, juvenile courts, licensing
authorities play an increasing role in supplanting or supplementing the
crude sanctions of the criminal law."3 Against these, with their narrower
halo of judicial sanctity, there is much less disposition to refuse injunc-
tion or declaration, the statute or regulation when entrusted to their ad-
ministration being often characterized as "quasi-criminal."
The cases indicate that injunctions have often been granted where there
was no evidence of irreparable injury, inadequacy of legal remedy or
emergency warranting the use of so drastic a remedy as peremptory in-
junction. In Terrace v. Thompson 0 4 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,"
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,6 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,01
and numerous other police power cases, none of the conditions warrant-
ing the grant of injunction were present, yet that seemed to the Court
the only available vehicle of adjudication. This was really an abuse
criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution, even though alleged to be unauthor-
ized and hence unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extra-
ordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid,"
Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 312 U. S. 45, 49 (1941), quoted in Watson v. Buck,
313 U. S. 387, 400 (1941). The defendant of course was a corporation. Said the English
Court of Appeal in a leading opinion in a declaratory judgment action: "It would be a
blot on our system of law and procedure if there is no way by which a decision on the
true limit of the power of inquisition vested in the Commissioners can be obtained by any
member of the public aggrieved, without putting himself in the invidious position of
being sued for a penalty." Farwell, J., in Dyson v. Attorney-General, [1911] 1 K, B.
410, 421 (C. A.). See BORCHARD, op. cit. sipra note 3, at 968.
62. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.. 154 U. S. 362, 392 (1894) ; Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898). Day, J., in Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 241
(1904), said: "It is well settled that where property rights will be destroyed unlawful
interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may be reached and
controlled by a decree of a court of equity." The recent harsher remarks concerning the
refusal to enjoin a criminal prosecution have been made in cases where a federal injunc-
tion against state proceedings under an allegedly unconstitutional statute was sought, Cf.
Beal and Watson cases, supra notes 30, 52, 61.
63. CI. Warner and Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice Dur-
ing the Past Fifty Years (1937) 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 609 et seq.
64. 263 U. S. 197 (1923).
65. 262 U. S. 553 (1923).
66. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
67. 272 U. S. 365 (1926). See Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498
(1932), where tax collection was enjoined, thus limiting a statute in order to make a
declaration on validity; cf. Comment (1932) 45 HARv. L. Rav. 1221.
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of the injunction in order to grant a declaration of rights, which should
have been sought and granted-at least now-co nomnine without circum-
locution.
This expansive use of the injunction beyond the proper limits of that
procedure has had two results, apart from confusing the law of remedies.
It has caught numerous plaintiffs in the tangled maze of procedure relat-
ing to injunction, whereas all they desired was a ruling on the substantive
merits; " and it has produced a concerted attack on the alleged abuse of
the injunction, reflected in a flood of anti-injunction statutes and bills in
labor and other specific types of cases. 9 The better practice is to ask in
the prayer for relief for both a declaration of rights and an injunction,
since the denial of the injunction instead of dismissing the action or
denying relief may nevertheless result in a declaration of rights, all that
the petitioner in most cases really needs."h In a recent Tennessee case, the
owners of a pool room in iMemphis sought, on the ground of unfair and
unconstitutional discrimination against pool rooms in a single county, to
68. See Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95 (1932). in which the petitioner by injunc-
tion against federal flood control officers sought to determine that the overflow of land
constituted a "taking" of his land entitling him to compensation. The case was in the
federal courts five times on the issue whether he was entitled to an injunction. On the
last occasion the Supreme Court denied the injunction, still without passing on the sub-
stantive issue raised. A declaration was all the petitioner really needed. See discussion
in BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 434.
69. The Johnson Acts of 1934, 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 23 U. S. C. §41(l) (1940),
and 1937, 50 STAT. 752 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 380a (1940), denying federal courts the
power to issue injunctions against state rates and taxes under certain circumstances are
probably designed to prevent federal adjudication mad not merely injunction. The
Supreme Court followed the Johnson Act principle and its own reluctance to interfere
with state jurisdiction in declining to issue a federal declaratory judgment hwlding
imalid the collection by Louisiana officials of certain unemployment insurance taxes
alleged to be unwarranted. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, Administrator,
63 Sup. Ct. 1070, decided 'May 24, 1943. See BoRcamn, op. cit. mopra note 3. at 367.
That the Court's policy of withholding its equity jurisdiction to restrain the enforce-
ment of state laws (Illustrations by Black, J., in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 63 Sup. Ct.
1098 at 1107, note, decided May 24, 1943) has gradually led to the practical abrogation
of the diversity jurisdiction in these cases is evidenced by the majority (5) and minority
(4) opinions in Burford et al. v. Sun Oil Co., supra. Even though Justice Duuglas in a
concurring opinion (with Murphy, J.) rejects the imputation of the minority (by Frank-
furter, J.) that "the enforcement of state rights created by state legislation and affecting
state policies is limited to the state courts" the margin of permissible federal jurirdiction
must now be pretty narrow. If the Supreme Court continues to show such deference
to state adjudication and to withhold federal jurisdiction, as evidenced in the Beal and
Watson cases, they will make it exceedingly difficult ever to obtain an injunction in the
federal courts against the enforcement of state statutes, will make section 246 of the
judicial Code of minor importance, and will render the Fourteenth Amendment invohable
primarily only after the exhaustion of proceedings in the state courts.
70. See the list of cases in BoRcHARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 436, where this prac-
tice was followed.
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have declared unconstitutional and to enjoin the enforcement of a statute
which under penalty required them to restrict their business. 71 While the
court refused on traditional grounds to enjoin the prosecution of a crim-
inal offense, they nevertheless issued a declaration of unconstitutionality,
which settled the case. In reality, courts that are aware of the utility of a
declaratory judgment do not need the aid of a specific prayer for declara-
tory relief but may on their own motion, if for any reason they find an
injunction not appropriate, issue instead a declaration of rights, which
usually serves fully the purpose of the litigants.
72
PERSONAL THREAT AS A CONDITION OF INJUNCTION
AND JUSTICIABILITY
Since the United States Supreme Court, correspondingly influencing in-
ferior courts, has fallen into the baleful but sporadic habit of regarding
a police power statute not as a regulatory restriction upon the plantiff's
freedom of action but as a mere occasion, if invalid, for a "personal tort"
by the Attorney-General, the courts have centered their attention not on
the compulsive effects and implications of the statute but on the wrongful
"threat" of the Attorney-General or other enforcing officer. This demand
for proof of "threat" has become something of a fetish. Unless an appro-
priate official "threatened" to enforce a statute against the plaintiffs,
they were presumably legally unaffected by the statute although gravely
jeopardized economically or socially.
There are six objections which may appropriately be directed against
this unsound view:
(a) It rests on a premise contrary to fact, since petitioners are placed
in jeopardy by a statute or ordinance requiring them under penalty to
change their mode of life or business, to which a threat by the Attorney-
General only adds weight but of which it is not the source. The jeopardy
lies in the statute, not in the Attorney-General, and it is the statute that
they challenge and not the Attorney-General's threat. A threat in any
event is only one type of jeopardy, which may be created-and therefore
initiates justiciability-by an event, like war; by a document, like a stat-
ute or a deed; by a personal act, like an unjust charge or claim; or, among
other challenges, by a threat of an enforcing officer, alone or, as usual,
in combination with other operative facts."
71. See Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927).
72. See also Federal Rule 57, Committee Note: ". . . when coercive relief only is
sought but is deemed ungrantable or inappropriate, the court may sia sponic, if it serves
a useful purpose, grant instead a declaration of rights. Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich.
466 (1933)."
73. The decision in Tileston v. Ullman, State's Attorney, 63 Sup. Ct. 493 (U. S. 1943),
presents a curious history. Here Dr. Tileston sought a declaratory judgment, on proof of
the medical necessity for giving contraceptive advice to three named married women
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(b) The Court itself has recognized the irrelevance of any threat by
the Attorney-General by permitting without threat an injunction against
the enforcement of numerous state statutes and ordinances which exposed
to danger and loss the plaintiff's property or personal freedom of action,
such as in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,"4 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"
whose lives would have been endangered by pregnancy, that an 1879 Connecticut statute
which penalized the giving of such advice by anyone was too broad, and by prohibiting
physicians in such circumstances was unconstitutional under the state and federal consti-
tutions. The Court concluded, per curiam, that the doctor had no standing to challenge
the fact that his patients' lives were thereby endangered, and that while invoking his
"liberty" to give the necessary advice and practice medicine in an orthodox way, he had
not in the complaint properly invoked the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court went
further. They raised but did not pass upon the question of justiciability, "case or con-
troversy." They demanded a "threat." In actual fact, the physician had with his counsel
visited the State's Attorney, told him the dilemma he faced, and asked whether, if he
gave the advice, the State's Attorney would prosecute. Such a prosecution had tal:en
place recently in another case, State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A. (2d) 856 (1940).
The State's Attorney answered in the affirmative, whereupon Dr. Tileston sued him for a
declaration that he was privileged and would not, if he gave the advice, violate the stat-
ute, since the statute as drawn was unconstitutional. The stipulation reads (para. 15):
"The defendants, State's Attorney and City Attorney, in the course of their public duty,
intend to prosecute any offense against said statutes and common law, and claim or may
claim that the prescription, advice, procurement, delivery and instruments proposed ky
plaintiff to be given as aforesaid would constitute such offenses" (italics supplied). This
claim the physician denied. The Court in its per curiam opinion emphasized the words
"claim or may claim" and in the argument queried whether this could constitute a
"threat." Apart from the fact that a State's Attorney's "threat" should have been deemed
immaterial in the face of the earlier prosecution and the manifestly ostensible violation
of the statute involved in giving the prohibited advice, the statement that the enforcement
officers "intend to prosecute" was an adequate threat. What they may claim in the course
of the prosecution is incidental. Nothing needed to be said on that subject. The fact is
that if they prosecuted at all, they would have to claim that giving such advice offended
the statute. The case illustrates the irrelevant by-paths into which the supposed require-
ment of a "threat" can lead the courts. See criticism of the decision in the Tileston case
by Professor Carpenter in (1943) 16 So. CALrF. L. R v. 224. Says Professor Carpenter:
"If the plaintiff had given advice which was prohibited by the statute and was being
prosecuted for its violation, he would have standing to question the constitutionality of the
statute. The purpose of declaratory relief which is to make it possible for him to deter-
mine his constitutional rights in advance, without undergoing the hazard of fine and
imprisonment, is defeated by this decision." For a similar argument, in reverse, i.e., be-
cause the injured person coqld as plaintiff have sued the insurance company, the company
was justified in making him an added defendant in their declaratory suit against the in-
sured, disclaiming liability under the policy, see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal
& Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270 (1941).
74. 272 U. S. 365 (1926). See also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553,
593 (1923), where suit to enjoin West Virginia from restraining prcduction Lf domestic
natural gas for West Virginia uses was brought a few days after the Act went into
effect. No effort to enforce or threat was made. Said Justice Van Devanter: "One does
not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief."
The injury was not imminent.
75. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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Terrace v. Thompson,76 Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,"7 Gibbs v. Buck, 8 Cur-
rin v. Wallace." In all these cases, where the statute placed the plaintiff in
jeopardy, no threat was uttered or required by the Court as a condition
of justiciability. Even a disclaimer of any duty to enforce did not bar the
injunction. The inconsistency in the application of the Court's require-
ment is apparent.
(c) The Court recognizes that where freedom of speech is impaired
by a statute, it is the statute and not the administrative application which
is challenged and under review. As announced in Thornhill v. Alabama :0
"Where regulations of the liberty of free discussion are concerned,
there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute,
and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the
limits of permissible conduct and warns against transgression." 81
This statement recognizes that the rule has an application wider than
cases involving free speech and evidences the Court's appreciation of the
fact that the statute is the source of the grievance and not the adminis-
trative accusation or enforcement.
(d) Since the "threat" of enforcement is viewed as a condition prece-
dent of justiciability, and since such threat is deemed the individual act
of some person, the injunction came naturally to be looked upon as an
instrument to restrain an imminent wrong, incidental to which the justifi-
cation for the alleged wrong, the statute, would have to be passed upon.
The procedural vehicle, instead of the substantive issue at stake, thus
focussed the Court's attention. On the foundation of an erroneous theory
which pictured a high public official of the state as a common tortfeasor,
there was built a superstructure of further fictions which distorted the
judicial process and cloaked the error in the guise of a constitutional
truth.
76. 263 U. S. 197 (1923).
77. 298 U. S. 238 (1936). See also City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291
U. S. 24, 34 (1934).
78. 307 U. S. 66 (1939).
79. 306 U. S. 1 (1939). There are many state cases illustrating the point. See, e.g.,
Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 Atl. 195 (1935) ; Bronxville Associates
v. Brady, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 308 (Westchester County Sup.. Ct. 1942); Kirn v. Noyes,
262 App. Div. 581, 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 90 (1941) ; American Federation of Labor v. Bain,
165 Ore. 183, 106 P. (2d) 544 (1940). In the following cases there was no threat
to enforce or prosecute: Sandelin v. Collins, 1 Cal. (2d) 147, 33 P. (2d) 1009 (1934) ;
Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 135, 7 S. W. (2d) 836 (1928) ; Bank of Yorktown v. Boland,
280 N. Y. 673, 21 N. E. (2d) 191 (1939); Chamberlin v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1,
2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936); Brown v. University of New York, 242 App. Div. 85,
273 N. Y. Supp. 809 (3rd Dep't 1934) ; Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wash. (2d) 498,
104 P. (2d) 478 (1940) ; Minister of Customs v. McParland, [1909] 29 N. Z. 279.
80. 310 U. S. 88, 98 (1940).
81. Citing Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 155, 162-63 (1939); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U. S. 359, 368 (1931). Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939).
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(e) The Attorney-General becomes the only one who as of right can
challenge the statute. By the mere process of refraining from a "threat"
to enforce or prosecute he can frustrate all opportunity of the victim or
taxpayer or affected citizen to raise the issue. Thus he alone can control
the possibility of litigation and the public must assume all the risks of
observing an unconstitutional statute or exposing its members to a crim-
inal prosecution.
(f) The requirement of a "threat" has led to some extraordinary ex-
amples of construction, enabling the courts to construe acts and words
strictly and narrowly, so that action which will appear to some courts as
a sufficient evidence of threatened serious consequences resulting from
violation will appear to others as innocuous statements.
s2
THE RATIONALIZATION OF EX PARTE YouG--THE PERSON.L TORT
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may deprive a per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of law or deny to any
person within the jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. State
action is therefore deemed necessary, and a statute or ordinance is the
clearest expression of state action. But the Eleventh Amendment provides
in effect that no state may be sued in the federal courts without its con-
sent. How then reconcile the Fourteenth Amendment, which permits cer-
tain suits against the state or its officers, with the Eleventh Amendment,
which ostensibly prohibits suits against the state?
Instead of concluding on the basis of plentiful authority that the Elev-
enth Amendment only prohibited suits designed to extract money from
the public treasury or coerce a state to perform an obligation, for which
Chief justice Marshall had laid ample foundation,"3 Justice Peckham in
Ex parte Young gave the prohibition a literal interpretation. He then fol-
lowed that mistake by another more devious holding that the challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute must be directed not against the state
as a party but against the enforcing officer who, when enforcing an un-
constitutional statute, is really not an authorized official of the state-the
82. The Supreme Court is narrower in this respect than other courts and may influ-
ence them to restrict the injunctive relief and adjudication. In the TilcstM case, 63
Sup. Ct. 493 (U. S. 1943), another conviction under the same statute and thu State's
Attorney's statement that he "intends to prosecute" left the Supreme Cturt uncertain
that there was a "threat," although it never occurred to the Connecticut courts tj
raise such a question. In Watson v. Buck-, 313 U. S. 387, 399 (1941), a three-judge
federal court finding that "defendants have threatened to and will enforce such State
Statutes," was deemed insufficient because they did not find "any threat to enforce any
specific provision" of the statute. The Court construed the activities of the several
Attorneys General defendants as a mere e~xpression of readiness "to perform their dutius
under their oath of office should they acquire knowledge of violations.!
83. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 W heat. 738, 846 (U. S. 124);
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406 (U. S. 1821).
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only reason for making him a defendant and essential under the Four-
teenth Amendment-but a wrongdoing individual tortfeasor unprotected
by the mantle of the state and therefore exposed to personal liability. He
might thus incur heavy damages."4 Justice Peckham was bothered by the
conviction that he must avoid permitting the state to be made a party, and
therefore conceived the "wrongdoing" enforcement officer, even if com-
manded to enforce, as an escape from this dilemma."' But the escape was
awkward, since the suit would necessarily proceed against the defendant
as a state officer. .If the statute proved on trial to be valid, he was a law-
abiding individual and nothing derogatory was said about him; but if the
statute after trial and appeal was found unconstitutional, then we are told
that from the very beginning he was an individual tortfeasor, taking ad-
vantage of his official position and a defective statute to injure the plain-
tiff. And if in the process of adjudication through several courts the
judicial opinion fluctuated between constitutionality and unconstitution-
ality, the defendant's status must also have varied. An intelligent bar
was expected to accept this inconsistency."0
Justice Peckham realized that the statute imposed a duty of enforce-
ment on the Attorney-General. In obedience to that duty he may have
had to commence a mandamus proceeding in the name of the state. The
threat of enforcement involved in commencing proceedings was enough
to justify injunction, if accompanied by an allegation of unconstitution-
ality. He is the enforcing officer, and as legal representative of the state
must be named in the bill of complaint as a party, in order to avoid the
awful inference that the state is being sued without its consent. If the
governing statute should be held unconstitutional after trial and appeal,
he loses whatever protection the statute gave him and stands, whether as
plaintiff or defendant, as a naked wrongdoer stripped of the mantle of legal
protection. In that event, the legal duty to enforce becomes, instead, an
ex post facto duty not to commit a personal wrong, a trespass, as any inci-
84. Unless he is to be protected by the doctrine of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940), and State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N,
E. 999 (1896), that an unconstitutional statute can create legal rights and afford protec-
tion to an officer acting thereunder. But this further weakens Justice Peckham's ration-
alization.
85. The result is curious. On a criminal prosecution the accused may attack the state
statute and use the state's name in his moving papers, by way of defense, counterclaim
or on the appeal, but on a civil challenge there is a fear that, though the state is actually
challenged, it may be made a party by name. Only the Attorney-General may be a party,
not as an officer of the state, necessary under the Fourteenth Amendment, but as a pri-
vate individual, assumed to be necessary under the Eleventh. Thus at the same time he
is a public officer and a private individual, justifying the strange caption in Watson v.
Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941), infra note 86.
86. The result is that we find curious captions in suits challenging constitutionality,
such as "Gene Buck ... v. J. Tom Watson (Gibbs) Individually and as Attorney Gen-
eral of Florida, et al.," 313 U. S. 387, 136 A. L. R. 1426, 1438 (1941).
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dental commencement of an enforcement suit would be. But he has to eat
the suspect to find out whether it is a mushroom or a toadstool. "Acting
within the scope of his employment" becomes a nugatory defense, since
an unconstitutional statute is a mere nothing. This is a reiteration of the
overruled view of Norton v. Shelby Count ,.87 The poor Attorney-Gen-
eral in some states has not even the protection that minor officials enjoy
under declaratory judgments statutes,8s of initiating a proceeding to es-
tablish against challenge the constitutionality of the statute they are being
asked to enforce.8 9
Thus the unfortunate Attorney-General is in a dilemma and bound to
suffer disadvantages in either case. If he fails to perform his mandatory
duty to enforce, he faces impeachment and removal from office; if he
does his duty, he faces denunciation and liability as a trespasser. His
unhappy lot is not mitigated by any reward for guessing correctly whether
the legislature and executive went astray in enacting the statute. In any
event, he must review for himself the constitutionality of what they have
done and stake his future on choosing the lesser of the evils involved in
the dilemma Justice Peckham has created for him. He is like the subma-
rine officer under the unratified Washington Treaty of 1922. If he obeys
his orders and launches a torpedo, he is liable to be punished as a pirate;
if he disobeys, he gets shot.
Justice Peckham did catch a glimpse of the easy road out of the maze
he had devised, but, not clearly seeing the exit, took the wrong fork and
remained entangled. He correctly concluded that a petition for habeas
corpus against a state official on the ground that the imprisonment or de-
tention was in violation of the Federal Constitution was not considered,
87. 118 U. S. 425, 442 (1886), overruled by the Chicoi County case, 303 U. S. 371
(1940).
88. Before the Declaratory Judgments Act, even minor officials had generally to
assume the risks of constitutionality of the statute under which they were required to
act. Note the officer's dilemma in Norwood v. Goldsmith, 16S Ala. 224, 53 So. S4 (1910).
Cf., under the declaratory judgments procedure, Graham v. England, 154 Tenn. 435, 2,4S
S. W. 728 (1926), and cases discussed in BoRCeARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 974 Cf seq.
Public officers can now avoid these risks.
89. "But we have held that when an officer of the State is confronted with an uncer-
tain problem of what the law means which requires certain acts on his part, or whether
the law is valid, and he proposes to pursue a certain course of conduct in that connection,
which would injuriously affect the interests of others who contend that he has no legal
right thus to act, there is thereby created a controversy between them and the Declara-
tory judgments Act furnishes a remedy for either party against the other to declare the
correct status of the law. The purpose is to settle a controversy between individuals,
though some of them may be State officers. Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp., 242 Ala.
379, 6 So. (2d) 479." Quoted from State v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 11 So. (2d)
342, 345 (Ala. 1943). In the Curry case, a declaration against the Commissioner of Rev-
enue, it was expressly held, with much authority cited, that such a suit was not a "suit
against the State." See also BorcHArD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 88 ct seq.
19431
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
even though somewhat coercive, a prohibited suit against the state. Said
he:
"The right to so discharge has not been doubted by this court,
and it has never been supposed there was any suit against the State
by reason of serving the writ upon one of the officers of the State
in whose custody the person was found ..
He then went on to say:
"It is somewhat difficult to appreciate the distinction which,
while admitting that the taking of such a person from the custody
of the State by virtue of service of the writ on the state officer in
whose custody he is found, is not a suit against the State, and yet
[maintains that] service of a writ on the Attorney General to pre-
vent his enforcing an unconstitutional enactment of a state legisla-
ture is a suit against the State." 11
Had the learned Justice stopped right there, he would have found the
road back and solved the puzzle he had invented. Attorney-Generals and
enforcing officers could freely, as public officials, have been named as
defendants in actions to challenge an oppressive statute. Their personal
opinion as to whether they should or should not carry out their statutory
duty, whether the statute was constitutional or deserved enforcement,
would have been, as it should be, immaterial. But evidently the Justice
did not fully believe in his own demonstration, for he must, after all, have
considered a suit against the Attorney-General a suit against the state, at
least if the statute proves unconstitutional, and thus devised the compli-
cated and untenable rationalization discussed above. This is on a par
with Justice Sanford's assertion in the discredited and essentially over-
ruled case of Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis l that the Attorney-Gen-
eral had not displayed any personal antagonism to the Warehouse Com-
pany 92 and therefore the tobacco auctioning statute could not be judicially
challenged.
But the result is more unfortunate than a mistaken theory. Since the
Attorney-General was sued as an individual, he could, by refraining from
enforcement or threat, by mere equivocation, frustrate any test of consti-
tutionality. He could by inaction defeat justiciability. This is what hap-
pened in Southern Pacific Company v. Conway. 3 Although charged
90. 209 U. S. 123, 168 (1908).
91. 273 U. S. 70 (1927), essentially overruled in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933). See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 172
et seq.
92. "While the Commonwealth Attorney is made a defendant as a representative of
the Commonwealth, there is no semblance of any adverse litigation with him individu-
ally. . . ." 273 U. S. 70, 73 (1927).
93. 115 F. (2d) 746 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
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mandatorily with the enforcement of the Arizona Train Limit Law, the
Attorney-General moved to dismiss the suit of the railroad challenging its
constitutionality, on the ground that he, the Attorney-General, really in
defiance of the statute and of his duty, had taken no action and uttered
no threat. He contended, therefore, that he was not a proper party de-
fendant because he was sued not as a state enforcement officer but as a
private individual who, having taken no action, was not a wrongdoer.
Disclaiming any personal interest as an individual in the enforcement of
the Train Limit Law, he contended that he could not be sued as Attorney-
General because that would be a suit against the state. Vhile the circuit
court of appeals refused to accept that theory, they did conclude that his
personal opinion or absence of opinion and inaction were operative facts
which defeated justiciability."'
Thus, in spite of many Supreme Court cases which have admitted dec-
larations or injunctions against state statutes solely on the basis of their
impingement upon and violation of petitioner's constitutional rights, other
cases have adhered to all the mystical rationalization of Ex parte Young
and have demanded an enforcement officer's threat as a condition of justi-
ciability. They have thereby made the challenge to a statute dependent
upon the personal whims of the Attorney-General or district attorney who
can defeat justiciability by inaction, by admitting that he had no opinion,
by conceding or refusing to deny unconstitutionality. He thus becomes a
sort of third house of the legislature, usurping the powers of the judiciary,
passing upon the statutes enacted by the legislature and the Governor, with
full power to prevent a test of constitutionality." This is the anomalous
situation that an erroneous theory can create.
94. This is squarely contrary to the modern view that administrative agencies or
officers, in spite of their oath of office, have no business or power to pass on questions
of constitutionality, especially of their governing statute. Such a function is reserved
exclusively to the judiciary, a function which even they are reluctant to exercise. United
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 67 (1936). As stated by the United States Court of Ap-
peals in Panitz v. District of Columbia, 112 F. (2d) 39, 42 (App. D. C. 1940): "It is
this consideration for the orderly, efficient functioning of the processes of government
which makes it impossible to recognize in administrative officers any inherent power to
nullify legislative enactments because of personal belief that they contravene the consti-
tution,' citing Op. Atty. Gen. to the President, March 26, 1937, reprinted in Swisnm,
SELECTED PAPERS OF HOnMR CUMMINGS (1939) 273. See also 38 Op. Atty. Gem 252
(1935).
95. Even though the Attorney-General has a large measure of discretion, and not-
withstanding Justice Butler's belief in Ex paric La Prade, 2S9 U. S. 444 (1933), that
his oath of office made him in some way responsible for the observance of constitution-
ality, he is not supposed to ignore the express words of a statute. "He must obey the
mandate of the statute and he must bring the complaint and since it is a public action
and he charged with the statutory duty of conducting such actions, he must, to the best
of his ability, fulfill this public duty, as Attorney General, and his duty as a law;yer to
protect the interest of his client, the people of the state," Levitt v. Attorney General, 111
Conn. 634, 641, 151 Atl. 171, 174 (1930). Even where the language of the statute is per-
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ACCENTUATING THE ERROR-Ex PARTE LA PRADE AND RULE 25 (d)
It was bad enough to have Ex parte Young convert the Attorney-Gen-
eral into an individual tortfeasor in order to justify an injunction to re-
strain the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. Yet we might have
rid the law of the preposterous rationalization of Justice Peckham but
for the perpetuation and incrustation of the misconception in Justice
Butler's opinion and dictum in Ex parte La Prade. Quite independently
of the issue of constitutionality, this decision maintained that as a condi-
tion of continuing a suit in the federal courts against the successor of the
original Attorney-General, the new Attorney-General, having no privity
with the first, must on his own account personally renew the original
threat. Referring to the second Attorney-General as the petitioner, Jus-
tice Butler stated, without necessity:
"Plaintiffs did not allege that petitioner threatened or intended
to do anything for. the enforcement of the statute [the Arizona
Train Limit Law]. The mere declaration of the statute that suits
for recovery of penalties shall be brought by the Attorney-General
is not sufficient. Petitioner might hold, as plaintiffs maintain, that
the statute is unconstitutional and that, having regard to his official
oath, he rightly may refrain from effort to enforce it." 06
Thus the bog grew deeper and thicker. It was responsible for the strange
opinion in Southern Pacific Company v. Conway, 7 for Judge Wilbur,
writing the opinion, had sat on the three-judge court in the La Prade case
missive, when the statute is for the benefit of the public-which is the assumption in most
police power statutes-the Attorney-General has no discretion not to enforce the statute,
See Supervisors v. United States, ex rel., 4 Wall. 435 (U. S. 1866). Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Brightman, 53 F. (2d) 161 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), involved a statute giving a bank
commissioner full discretion in exercising administrative duties over banks, where lie
was held not responsible for errors of judgment. It seems incongruous to assume that
an Attorney-General's opinion on the constitutionality of a statute he is under a man-
datory duty to enforce should be deemed to relieve him of that duty. His opinion seems
irrelevant. It certainly does not bind his successors or the judiciary. See Austin v. Bar-
rett, 41 Ariz. 138, 144, 16 P. (2d) 12, 14 (1932) ; Leddy v. Cornell, 52 Colo. 189, 120 Pac,
153 (1912) ; People ex rel. Brundage v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223, 137 N. E. 118 (1922).
96. 289 U. S. 444, 458 (1933). He adds that the theory of Ex parte Young had been
adopted by the court in "numerous decisions," citing Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 U. S. 636, 642 et seq. (1911) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37 (1915),
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214 (1923) (no threats); Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U. S. 378, 393 (1923). But the Young theory in the last case is expressed more
mildly: "The applicable principle is that where state officials, purporting to act tinder
state authority, invade rights secured by the Federal Constitution, they are subject to the
process of the federal courts in order that the persons injured may have appropriate re-
lief." The Court added, "The Governor of the State, in this respect, is in no different
position from that of other state officials." The Court asserted categorically all that
needed to be said: "The suit is not against the State."
97. 115 F. (2d) 746 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
[Vol. 52 -4,15
CHALLENGING "PENAL" STATUTES
below, a decision which warranted affirmance. not reversal. Since the
problem in the La Prade case was exclusively one of substitution, Justice
Butler's insistence on the Attorney-General's personal threat and personal
opinion of constitutionality as a condition of justiciability might be con-
sidered a dictum. But it gave new life to the often disregarded conception
of the Attorney-General as a personal tortfeasor, to the requirement of a
preliminary "threat," and to the conditions of injunctive relief. Disre-
garding the fact that the Attorney-General was sued only in his official
capacity and that this had been said in several cases without circumlocu-
tion not to constitute a prohibited suit against the state, the court revived
the idea of personal guilt as the condition of adjudicating the constitu-
tionality of a statute. How an officer carrying out his mandatory duty
to enforce a statute can be charged with "abuse of his office," " has never
been satisfactorily explained. The "abuse" would seem to lie in the prin-
cipal, the legislature, not the agent, the hapless officer. Recognizing the
"inherent difficulty" in all these cases, the Court felt logically bound to say
that since the first Attorney-General was sued in tort as a personal wrong-
doer, the second had to be sued under the same theory, and since there was
no privity between the two, the second would have to be charged with the
same wrongful acts as had been the first before substitution was permis-
sible. 9
Rule 25(d). The Federal Rules of court concerning substitution have
a statutory origin. Professor J. W. Moore in his standard work on Fed-
eral Practice "0 states that the Supreme Court in 1898 pointed out the
injustice involved in the common law rule that an action against a federal
public officer abated on his separation from office.1"1 Thereupon Congress
passed a statute providing an easy method of substituting as a party the
successor in office' -02 In 1922 the Supreme Court called attention to the
fact that state officers should be included in the rule, whereupon Congress
in 1925 in the course of a comprehensive amendment to the Judicial Code
98. Justice Butler in the La Prade case, referring to Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Wendell,
261 U. S. 1 (1923), says that Taft, C. J., in that case said: ". . . the inherent difficulty in
all these cases is not in the liability and suability of the successor in a new suit. It is
in the shifting from the personal liability of the first officer for threatened wrong or
abuse of his office to the personal liability of his successor when there is no privity be-
tween them, as there is not if the officer sued is injuring or is threatening to injure the
complainant, without lawful official authority. There is no legal relation between wrong
committed or about to be committed by the one, and that by the other." See Ex parle
LaPrade, 289 U. S. 444, 459 (1933).
99. In Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941), the Court seems to have overlooked
Ex parte La Prade, and permitted two substitutions of defendant Attorneys General, on
motion.
100. See Commentary on Rule 25(d) in 2 MOORE'S FEnDEnL PnAcrice (1938) 2432.
101. See United States ex rl. Bernardin v. Butterworth, 169 U. S. COD, C05 (1893).
102. 30 STAT. 822 (1899), 28 U. S. C. §780(a) (1940).
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amended the statute accordingly. 03  It provided in effect that where a
federal or state officer "dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold such
office," it shall be competent for the federal court in which a suit is pend-
ing against such officer, on notice or consent, "to permit the cause to be
continued and maintained by or against the successor in office," if "it be
satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial need for so
continuing and maintaining the cause." 104
Then came the Supreme Court's La Prade decision in 1933, which tin-
dertook to add to the requirements of the statute in suits against state
officers-since the Arizona statute was construed not to allow substitution
-an allegation and showing that the successor adopted or threatened to
adopt the attitude of his predecessor before substitution could be per-
mitted. As to federal officers the Court thought this requirement was not
necessary since Congress had made the successor officially responsible for
the acts of his predecessor, whereas Congress could not do this in the case
of state officers. Thus the unfortunate emendation of the 1925 Act found
its way into the new Federal Rules when either federal or state officers are
charged with enforcing an unconstitutional statute. Rule 25 (d) now
reads :
"Substitution 
. . . may be made when it is shown by supplemental
pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or continues or
threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor in en-
forcing a law averred to be in violation of the Constitution of the
United States." 105
Just what is meant by "adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or con-
tinue" is still unclear. But it manifests the unjustified conception originat-
ing in Ex parte Young that the mandatory official duty to enforce a stat-
ute implies a personal delinquency of the enforcing officer if the statute
103. See Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 223 (1922); amendment in 43 STAT. 941
(1925), 28 U. S. C. § 780 (1934) ; MoorE, loc. cit. supra note 100. See also Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. La Prade, 2 F. Supp. 855, 858 (D. Ariz. 1933).
104. The three-judge district court in the La Prade case gave the provision a sensi-
ble construction. They said: "The Arizona statute involved herein imposes the duty on
the Attorney General of the state, and him alone, to enforce the Train Limit Law. It
is a continuing statutory duty devolving upon each succeeding Attorney General of the
state. . . . The plaintiff's cause of action, in so far as the same may depend upon the
threatened injury, does not rest upon any expression of intent on the part of the defend-
ant other than his oath of office, as the threat is contained in the language of the statute,
When the defendant La Prade took the oath of office, it became his sworn duty to enforce
the law. As long as there is an Attorney General in the state, the threat of prosecution
is always present, and the injury, if any, resulting therefrom, is always impending,"
citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923). 2 F. Supp, 855, 858.
105. In non-constitutional cases, the only averment necessary under the first part of
Rule 25 (d) is "that there is a substantial need for so continuing and maintaining" the
action. 2 MooRE, op. cit. mntpra note 100, at 2433.
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should after test prove unconstitutional. This, it is submitted, is an un-
fortunate view of official duty, totally unnecessary to preserve the guar-
anties of the Fourteenth Amendment, and deserving of the earliest pos-
sible abrogation by a new rules committee, by the Court itself, or, if
necessary, by Congress.
CHALLENGING "PENAL" STATUTES
The common law is distinguished by its capacity to make distinctions
between varying fact situations. Its instinct for analytical jurisprudence
and its shunning of general theories have either commended or condemned
it. Yet in the field of statutes regulating commercial or civil life, the
appendage of a penalty to the regulation seems to anesthetize the imag-
ination and the power of analysis. The presence of the sanction, the least
important element of the regulation, seems to arouse all the latent slogans
of the criminal law, and in one hopper for identical treatment are thrown
murder, robbery, a purported violation of the anti-trust law, a physician's
challenge to a rigid law prohibiting information on birth control, statutes
regulating horse racing, tobacco auctioning, optometry, railroading, and a
thousand other police power measures which the legislature thinkcs can
be more effectively enforced by the sanction of a penalty.
On the side of administration, some distinctions are made in the appli-
cation of these statutes, by the regular police or by administrative com-
missions. But when it comes to challenging their constitutionality or con-
struction, many courts, declining to exercise their analytical powers, call
them all "criminal statutes," some insisting on a criminal prosecution as
the only vehicle of adjudication, some declining injunction against the
enforcement of a "criminal" statute, except under special circumstances. 1
106. See supra p. 460. For an example of judicial narrowness, see Dep't of State
v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 46 N. E. (2d) 237 (Ind. 1943). In this case two
lower Indiana courts had issued a declaratory judgment on Kroger's petition, after chal-
lenge by the Board of Pharmacy, that certain vitamin tablets which Kroger was selling
were accessory food factors and, after ecpert testimony, did not contain any chemical,
drug or medicine which was poisonous or a "prescription" or "pharmaceutical specialty,"
and, hence, were not prohibited under certain statutes and orders limiting the sale of
such articles to drug stores, as the Board of Pharmacy had claimd. The real issue
was the proper classification of the vitamin tablets as "foods" or "drugs." and no
question was raised as to the propriety of an adjudication by declaratory judgment.
Instead of appreciating the social utility of such a civil judgment, the Indiana Supreme
Court ordered the dismissal of the action for want of jurisdiction on the ground that
presumably only a "criminal prosecution" could decide such a momentous issue, since
it denied the jurisdiction of equity altogether, including the power even to issue an in-
junction "to restrain criminal prosecutions" or the "operation of criminal statutes:' on
the ground, wrong in fact, that "no property rights are here involved." The court (Shakze,
J.) denied the propriety of a declaratory judgment on the suppcsed ground that it "would
not be a bar to a criminal prosecution . . . nor" available in such proisecutit,n as an
adjudication of the facts in issue. That the disputed legislation was not a "criminal
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The fact that the motive of the actor, the intent to defy the social mores,
is the primary element in determining criminality, seems to be disregard-
ed as a basis of classification in the face of a penal sanction. The fact that
civilians, notably businessmen affected by these police power measures,
have every desire to obey a regulatory law but need a key to its meaning,
and have the right, preserved by state and federal constitutions, to chal-
lenge its constitutionality, if they consider themselves unduly restricted,
seems not to excite the requisite attention. The result is that whereas on
the substantive side the distinction between inalum in se and malum pro-
hibitum is well observed, on the procedural side it seems to be forgotten.
Here then lies a field in which general theories need analysis in the inter-
ests of an intelligent administration of law. Once it is recognized that the
much regimented business or professional man is not a murderer or robber
and is entitled to procedural consideration somewhat different in com-
plexion, the instrumentalities of the law may be re-examined to discover
whether the legal interests of the business and professional man challeng-
ing regulatory statutes or ordinances can be adjudicated only by the crude
machinery and orientation of the criminal law or whether there is not a
healthier, a more efficient and intelligent method of considering his legal
and judicial problems. Once it is realized that a criminal prosecution is,
except for extreme cases of defiance, an improper and socially undesir-
able method of adjudication, and that the injunction should be confined
to exceptional cases of emergency and immediately threatened irreparable
injury, it will be discovered by a process of elimination and classification
that the most practical way of adjudicating the great bulk of the issues
between the business man and the government is the action for a declara-
tory judgment of constitutionality or construction.
Analysis of the Conception "Criminal Law." The necessity for a break-
down of the broad and indiscriminate conception "criminal act," both for
substantive and procedural reasons, has attracted various reformers and
must have been present in the minds of courts which grant injunctions
against the enforcement of statutes with a penalty as a sanction. In his
penetrating paper "What is Crime?" 107 Mr. William M. Ivins of New
York objects to the loose criteria used in determining "criminality," to
the failure to consider ethical standards as an element, to the thousands
statute" at all but the Board of Pharmacy's police power regulation, that a criminal prose-
cution was a crude and actually inappropriate vehicle of adjudication, that a declaratory
judgment was the civilized method of deciding the issue, seems not to have occurred to
the court. Cf. the much more intelligent decision in New York Foreign Trade Zone
Operators v. State Liquor Authority, 285 N. Y. 272, 34 N. E. (2d) 316 (1941); Bon-
cHAw, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1033.
107. See (1911) 1 AcAv. oF POL. ScI. PRoc. 531 el seq. See also 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE (Sth ed. 1885) 572, for distinction between malum in se and inalon
prohibituin, and MAY, LAW OF CRIMES (4th ed. by Sears and Weihofen 1938) 6,
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of laws which undertake to produce salvation by legislation, and to the
practice of calling any law with a penal sanction a "criminal" law. He
considers it crude to determine the relation between the individual and
the group by the methods of criminal procedure. Among other things,
he says:
.. . criminality is a temperament, a state of mind, which, for
the purposes of the law, is evidenced by an overt and provable
fact-with this result, that we have the congenital or temperament-
al criminal, who is also an offender against universal ethical stan-
dards, and the occasional offender, who violates a particular decree
of the legislature, which has no necessary relation to any ethical
standards." These two have . . .nothing in common, and their
classification for treatment in a single class or group leads to the
most profound miscarriage of law and to the most shameful dem-
onstration of the ignorance of the people as to the relation, and
the importance of the relation, of the individual to the state." 103
He considers police power legislation as a modern category not con-
nected with the historical origins of the criminal law in offenses against
the life, liberty and property of individuals, but consisting of prohibi-
tions and regulations in the interests of community life. In their trans-
gression he finds no violation of any ethical rule, and courts, it may be
said, have acceded to this view by dispensing with any evidence of mets
rea. Chief justice Taft in United States v. Balint remarked:
"Many instances of this [punishment without knowledge or intent
that a statute is being violated] are to be found in regulatory meas-
ures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the
emphasis of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some so-
cial betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases
of n ala in se." (Citing cases), °3
This is a recognition of the distinction between two types of offenses.
While it calls attention to the difference in the social objectives of the two
classes, and therefore to the necessity for differentiating in the matter of
mens rea, it fails to discuss the reasons for adjudicating differently the
issue of the constitutionality or construction of the two types of offenses.
Particularly because police power measures aim at social betterment, are
108. See (1911) 1 AcAD. or POl- ScL PRoc. 531, 532.
109. 258 U. S. 250, 252 (1922). Part of this quotation is repeated by Frankfurter, J.,
in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 63 Sup. Ct. 379, 389 (U. S. 19431. Justice Rugg
of the -Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141,
142, 93 N. E. 249, 250 (1910) lists many cases in which police pmwer or regulatory meas-
ures have been violated and the offender held guilty although he did paot know that he
was violating any law or intend to violate any law. Guilty Imowledge was not necessary
to violate the statute or to be found guilty.
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regulatory and not "criminal" in character, and may be violated and pun-
ished without any guilty intent, there is all the more reason why the
affected victim or target of the regulation should have full opportunity to
determine, in advance of violation or prosecution, the preliminary and
essential question of the constitutionality and construction of the statute
or ordinance he is expected to obey. Other English-speaking jurisdictions
are familiar with this procedure,"' and on occasion our courts have con-
ceded its practical value."' There is every reason why it should be made
an integral part of American civil procedure.
In these cases injunction is common, provided irreparable injury is
shown, since these offenses are of a kind that are malhm prohibitoni,
where no public purpose is impaired by adjudicating the construction of
the statute before the offense is committed and without compelling the
commission of an offense as a condition of adjudication. These consid-
erations are absent in the case of crimes that are viala in se. If a person
is about to commit murder, robbery, or any other felony, no one would
suggest that he obtain an injunction or a declaration before commission
of the offense to find out what the statute means. The intent, purpose
and mens rea of the prospective offender and the nature of the regulation
he is supposed to be violating are crucial to the issue of determining
whether an injunction against enforcement or a declaration as to construe-
tion should precede the commission of the offense or should be denied
before the offense has been committed, and a criminal trial substituted.
Mr. Ivins in his article remarks that the generic word "crime" is only
a noise, becoming a name only when attached to a particular act; but lie
denies the power of the legislature to turn every regulation or prohibition
into a crime by appending a penal sanction. Such a power, he says.
"[would] take criminality out of all human categories, [and] place it
purely and simply in the category of legislative theory." He adds:
"One of the consequences which follows is the natural and neces-
sary bankruptcy of the criminal law, the impossibility of establishing
a science or an art of criminality which has any relation with our
actual science or actual art of legislation, the making unintelligible
of all theories of delictuosity, the mingling and confusing of all
theories of punibility, the impossibility of criminal statistics. ,, ".
He concludes by saying:
"Legislative declarations of this kind are, therefore, not categorical
but hypothetical, purely probative in requirement and without place
in the moral order. They do not fall properly under the category
110. See, e.g., Section 3 of the New Zealand Declaratory Judgments Act, 1908,
8 EDW. VII, No. 220.
111. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923) ; New York Foreign Trade
Zone Operators v. State Liquor Authority, 285 N. Y. 272, 34 N. E. (2d) 316 (1941).
112. (1911) 1 AcAD. OF POL. SCi. Paoc. 531, 553.
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'crime,' but simply under the category 'forbidden and penalized,'
i.e., the category in which might may exercise itself quite indepen-
dently of any consideration but temporary political expediency. It
does not follow that everything that is punishable is a crime, unless
it be crime because that is the very definition of crime." 113
Other commentators have sought to deal with the difficulties created
by the all-inclusive term crime and the necessity for differentiatiun. The
Hanard Law Review,114 following the late Professor Beale, sought tu
make a division between real crimes and what they called public torts.
The latter were inala quia prohibita only and should be treated as civil
injuries. They included, according to the Review, three classes-injuries
to public property, public nuisances and police offenses. They infringe
the public interest in health and security. But the conception was left
cloudy by the statement that the legislature could, if they thought the
offense serious, punish it as a "crime," and that the penalty should be
considered compensatory and not intended as punishment. The distin-
guishing character of this "public tort" was that no mens rea was required,
unless expressly demanded by the legislature, that trial by jury was not
constitutionally necessary, that the plea of double jeopardy was unavail-
ing, and that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt."' The fact that judicial authority could be
cited for these propositions is an indication that, while the nomenclature
has not been officially adopted, the need for subdivision of the term
crimes" is apparent.
In 1937 an effort was made in Wisconsin to make a new classification
of reg'ulatory offenses and to substitute, where appropriate, civil for
criminal liability as a sanction. A writer in the Wisconsin Law Rc-vicw l0
-describes the effort of Mr. John E. Conway, with the support of Gov-
ernor La Follette, to find workable criteria of classification for criminal
and civil prosecution and explains that the reasons for the reform lie in
the loose employment of the term "criminal" law, the resulting disrespect
for law, the inefficiency of social control thereby entailed, the injustice
inflicted on individuals who have no anti-social intent to violate the law,
and that the safeguards of criminal procedure actually hamper enforce-
ment of minor offenses and technical regulations better administered by
experts."1
7
113. Id. at 556.
114. See (1922) 35 HARv. L. REV. 462, relying on BEMXz, CASES OF Cr2TAL LAW
(3d ed. 1915) 81.
115. An editor in (1927) 12 IowA L. Rm. 407 makes the distinction between (a) true
crimes and (b) public torts, as to misdemeanors only, and follows in general the classifi-
cations of the Harvard Law Review.
116. (1937) 12 Wis. L. REv. 365.
117. Mr. Conway's major proposal would take out of the category of "criminal"
offenses those in which punishment is made absolute regardless of a mens rea, unless the
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Canada has to some extent had occasion to analyze crimes as distin-
guished from police power measures since the British North America
Act of 1867 gives the Dominion jurisdiction over criminal law, whereas
Section 92, No. 15 of the Act provides that "the imposition of punishment,
by fine, penalty, or imprisonment, for enforcing any law of the prov-
ince" is within the jurisdiction of the provinces. Under No. 13 the prov-
ince also has jurisdiction of "property and civil rights in the province."
The administration of justice in civil and criminal courts is also a provin-
cial matter. But procedure in criminal matters is federal.
While this division of powers between the Dominion and the provinces
is bound to produce some overlapping and jurisdictional difficulties, it has
legislature expressly provides that they shall not be prosecuted on the civil side and
makes mens rea an element of the offense. If punishable by fine, it shall also be a civil
offense only. Crimes at common law and those indicating a dangerous personality should
alone be left in the category of offenses punishable criminally. His introductory explana-
tion states :
"The study is primarily concerned with the substantive criminal law of Wisconsin.
It proceeds upon the assumptions that (1) law as a means of social control would be
made more effective if the substantive criminal law were revised to make it conform
more closely to the popular idea of what that law ought to be, especially in the field of
criminal intent; (2) since there seems to be a general feeling that respect for criminal
law is in some ratio inversely proportional to the number of crimes on the statute books,
and since the undiscriminating use of criminal law as a means of social control results
in placing the stigma of crime on persons not truly criminal, the use of criminal law
should be restricted to those cases where it alone can provide adequate means of con-
trol; (3) because the safeguards of criminal procedure hamper enforcement and prosecu-
tion of many minor offenses, and because many regulatory statutes require administra-
tion by technical experts to make enforcement effective, any act should be removed from
the criminal code when it can be shown that some type of civil procedure would produce
better results. . . . See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 COL. L. Rav. 55, 69.
And see Philip F. LaFollette, Enforcenwct of the Criminal Law (1925) 16 Reports of,
State Bar Assoc. of Wis. 143, 146." (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rv. 365, 366.
Mr. Conway's revisor's bill unburdening the criminal law of Wisconsin by making most
of the offenses subject to civil prosecution only, was approved by a committee of the
Wisconsin Bar Association (1937 Proc., vol. 27, p. 75) but has not yet been enacted by
the legislature.
Professor Hall has expressed his criticism of the undiscriminating use of the term
"criminal law" as follows: "The fact that in so many of these crimes a reasonable mis-
take of fact is not a defense has aided their enforcement but has greatly diminished, if not
entirely removed, the feeling that it is "wrong" to violate a statute merely because it
provides for penal sanctions. People believe that criminal liability should be avoided, as
one would avoid a reef, in self protection; but no moral constraint dictates obedience
to our modern bureaucracies. Such an indiscriminate use of the criminal law weakens
its hold as the arbiter of respectable conduct." Hall, The Substantive Law of Crines,
1887-1936 (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 616, 623.
In Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930), the Supreme Court recognized
the distinction between major and minor offenses, between "crimes" and misdemeanors
or petty offenses, by saying: "The word 'crimes' in Article III, Section 2, of the Con-
stitution, should be read in the light of the common law, and so read, it does not include
petty offenses." See Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65 (1904).
CHALLENGING "PENALE' STATUTES
on the whole resulted in an attempt of the courts to discover what are
matters of "criminal law" within federal jurisdiction, and to leave to
provincial jurisdiction matters of local regulation not deemed important
enough to warrant federal and uniform control. While the distinction
cannot be said to follow that between mala in se and mala prohibita, there
is an attempt to prevent the Dominion from encroaching on the provinces'
jurisdiction over property and civil rights. As described in a recent case
which went to the Privy Council:
"In deciding whether a statute falls within the authority of the
Legislature enacting it, the question must be decided from the whole
aspect of the enactment. The Dominion cannot, therefore, by pur-
porting to create penal sanctions under s. 91 (27) appropriate to
itself exclusively a field of jurisdiction, in which, apart from such
procedure, it could exert no legal authority, and if legislation is
found, when examined as a whole, to be in form criminal but in
aspects and for purposes wholly within the legislative authority of
the provinces, and to deal with matters exclusively committed to
the Provinces, it cannot be upheld. But when a provincial statute is
found in aspects and in purposes wholly within one of the sections
exclusively allotted to the Provinces but liable in its effect inciden-
tally to trench on powers exclusively given to the Dominion, such
incidental or collateral effect cannot be held to invalidate the Act." 118
Among matters that have been decided to be within the provincial penal
jurisdiction are the regulation of marketing, highway and motor control,
the care of children, the regulation of the consumption of liquor, the revo-
cation of optometrists' licenses, regulating miniature golf courses, fixing
the price of milk, the Security Frauds Prevention Act, the prohibition of
slot machines as a means of suppressing gaming houses, ie regulation of
the closing hours of stores and shops, penalties for the ill treatment
or neglect of infants, the regulation of dance halls, poor laws and state
aid to people in distress, and similar matters. On the other hand, aside
from the control of the more important crimes "' and matters of inter-
provincial commerce, the Dominion has been allowed to exercise control
over such police matters as Sunday law observance, the narcotic drug
traffic, champerty, the Food and Drugs Act, false registration in hotels,
118. Re Reciprocal Ins. Legislation, 41 Can. Crim. Cas. 336 (P. C. 1924), [1924]
A. C. 328, summary in 1 CHrrry, ABRIDG XENT OF THE CANADrA:N C.Imz:.'L CAsEi- LAw
(1925) 269. See also id. at 265-77. See also CANADIAN ENCYCLOPAEDIC DicEsT (Ontario
ed., Supplement to Apr. 30, 1938, ed. by Fowler and Guest, 1938) 1S9, 193. See also
LEFROY, CANADA's FEDERAL SYsTEm (1913) 319 et seq., and appendix, 789-91.
119. See CRANKSHAW'S CRIMNAL CODE OF CANADA (6th ed. 1935); Sxov:'s
CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA (5th ed. by Popple, 1939); WrARoN, Pnixca'LEs OF
CANADiAN CRImrAL LAw (1926); CANADIAN CRIMIN.L CAsEs ANNOTATED (77 vols.
to 1941).
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and penalties, other than license withdrawal, for driving while intoxi-
cated. The division is not, therefore, altogether clear, although in its main
outlines it does purport to distinguish what the courts have denominated
criminal law from local police measures for the protection of civil and
property rights, even by fine, penalty or imprisonment.
Canada's experience indicates a constitutional appreciation of the dis-
tinction between major offenses and police power legislation designed to
accomplish social betterment and civil regulation.
ADVANTAGES OF CIVIL ADJUDICATION
The confusion in the courts as to what is meant by "criminal" law, the
failure to make distinction between crimes involving turpitude and police
power measures carrying a penalty, the uncertain standard of "irrepara-
ble injury," the frequent absence of any emergency, have made it in
many cases quite unpredictable when an injunction against the enforce-
ment of a statute carrying penalties will be granted or refused. In par-
ticular cases in which injunction was granted or refused without refer-
ence to the procedural conditions of injunctive relief, as in the cases of
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,'2" Pierce v. Society of Sisters,121 Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 122 and Terrace v. Thompson,"'2 it is clear that the
injunction was merely invoked as a vehicle of substantive adjudication
and what was really granted was a declaratory judgment on the merits.
Where injunction or declaration was denied on jurisdictional grounds,
as in the Indiana case of Department of State v. Kroger Grocery, 2 4 it
was justified on the mechanical "reason" that equity should not foreclose
an eventual "criminal prosecution," although a criminal prosecution was
a crude and inappropriate method of adjudicating the statutory classifica-
tion of plaintiff's product as "food" or "drug" within the meaning of cer-
tain regulatory administrative orders. So the issue of the validity of
plaintiff's challenged conduct within the meaning of a law, requiring little
more than a construction or interpretation of the law in its relation to par-
ticular unchanging facts, has been adjudicated or not, according to the
predilection of the court for criminal trial, without any guiding criteria.
We have already observed ... that the failure to distinguish between
injunction and declaratory judgment has resulted in a considerable abuse
of the injunction, in court demands for a "threat" as a condition of jus-
ticiability where jeopardy alone should have been asked for, and in much
120. 262 U. S. 553 (1923).
121. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
122. 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
123. 263 U. S. 197 (1923). See also Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d)
145 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
124. 46 N. E. (2d) 237 (Ind. 1943). See note 106 supra.
125. See pp. 459, 464 supra.
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confusion in the appreciation of the conditions warranting a challenge
to the constitutionality or construction of regulatory statutes. In the pres-
ent closing sections of this article we hope to demonstrate that, in the
absence of moral turpitude, the simplest method of challenging regula-
tory statutes carrying a penalty is by action for a declaration of validity
or invalidity or for construction.
At least one purpose of the declaratory judgment was correctly an-
nounced by the New York Court of Appeals in a leading case, as fol-
lows:
"The general purpose of a declaratory judgment is to quiet and
stabilize uncertain or disputed jural relations either as to present or
prospective obligations, and no limitation has been placed, or at-
tempted to be placed, upon its use." 120
An excellent statement of the point we are here seeking to make with
reference to the disputed construction of statutes was announced by United
States District Judge Cavanah in Sunshine Mining Co. v. Carver,12-
a case frequently quoted and cited. This was an action seeking, after
challenge, a declaratory judgment that the penal section of the Wages
and Hours provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act could not validly
be applied to the plaintiffs for their practice in deducting the lunch period
from the hours of labor prevailing in their mine. Judge Cavanah re-
marked:
"... ordinarily an injunction would not be granted against a prose-
cuting officer to enforce the violation of a criminal statute, but where
additional procedure is now granted under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, granting to the citizen the right to raise the issue as to wheth-
er their conduct does or does not violate the criminal law, and affects
his property rights, he is not required to wait indefinitely under such
suspension. Where there are unexecuted threats, could not the plain-
tiff, engaged in business, be in a position to challenge the validity of
the claim of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor and the Department of Justice, that its business is conducted
not in violation of law, by assuming the initiative ?
"Such a transfer of interpretation of statute, from criminal to a
civil Court, should be approved where the plaintiff under this new
additional remedy, the Declaratory Judgment Act, shows a substan-
tial controversy existing. It is a too narrow view of the judicial
functions and under the Declaratory Judgment Act to assert that
the only method of trying the validity of the business practice here
is to wait until the prosecution occurs." '3
126. See James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N. Y. 293, 176 N. E. 401 (1931). Quoted
by Justice Dore in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 247 App. Div. 163, 10,
287 N. Y. Supp. 288, 292 (1st Dep't 1936).
127. 34 F. Supp. 274 (D. Idaho 1940).
128. Id. at 280. See also Note (1940) 129 A. L. R. 751.
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It will be recalled that the United States Supreme Court in the Haworth
case 129 made special mention of the fact that it made no difference in
the matter of justiciability whether insurer or insured (creditor or debtor,
claimant or claimee, prosecutor or accused) initiated the action for a
declaratory judgment. The issue was not thereby changed. The question
whether the victim or target of a police power measure should be entitled
to challenge the meaning or applicability or constitutionality of the statute
becomes then only a question of policy. Every practical consideration, in
our opinion, justifies the view that the declaratory action of the victim or
party charged is the most efficient of all methods of raising these issues.
CONSTITUTIONALITY (VALIDITY), APPLICABILITY (IMMUNITY),
CONSTRUCTION
It really makes little difference whether the proceeding to contest the
statute challenges its constitutionality, its applicability to the plaintiff, or
its construction in a particular case. Some of these claims often overlap.
For example, it not infrequently happens that a statute must first be
construed before its constitutionality or applicability can be determined, as
was necessary in deciding whether the supply of credit information by a
credit agency to business men constituted a "sale" within the meaning of
the law governing payment of sales taxes.130 Nor does it make any dif-
ference whether the sanction which creates the plaintiff's dilemma and
resulting justiciability is found in a tax, the requirement of a license, the
danger of losing a license, a forfeiture or civil penalty, a criminal pen-
alty or prosecution. All of these sanctions jeopardize the plaintiff who
claims the privilege of acting free from the imposition of such a burden,
threat, danger or penalty. What is important is that courts of equity,
invoked by injunction or declaration, should no longer be able to turn
away a petitioner claiming the privilege of conducting his business, e.g.,
129. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
130. See Dun & Bradstreet v. City of New York, 276 N. Y. 198, 206, 11 N. E. (2d)
728, 732 (1937), where the Court of Appeals, by Hubbs, J., remarked: "The undisputed
facts in this case make it peculiarly one where the remedy of a declaratory judgment
should be granted. That remedy is applicable in cases where a constitutional question is
involved or the legality or meaning of a statute is in question and no question of fact is
involved. In such cases, pure questions of law are presented. It would be difficult to imag-
ine a case where that remedy would be more applicable." The court was not quite cor-
rect in the inference that if there was a disputed question of fact a declaration is barred.
That is not so. See Rockland Light & Power Co. v: City of New York, 289 N. Y. 45,
43 N. E. (2d) 803 (1942); BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 391. It seems too
bad that the New York Court of Appeals by repetition gives currency to the error that
the declaratory judgment is an extraordinary remedy which can only be granted when no
other remedy is available. Actually, the court seldom acts on that erroneous assumption,
which is in conflict with the plain wording of the statute. See BoRcHrDM, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 315, 327.
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marketing his goods in interstate commerce free from the requirement
of a heavy municipal tax, by remanding him to the criminal courts with
the ingenuous remark that if the ordinance is valid he ought to pay, and
if invalid, the prosecution will fail.13' He should not be obliged to violate a
statute carrying a criminal penalty in order to find out what it means and
whether it is constitutional as applied.
Constitutionality. The courts have shown little hesitation in passing
by declaratory action on the constitutionality and validity of criminal stat-
utes, ordinances and regulations, adopted under the police power. The
operators of pool rooms,132 of taxi-cabs,13  of railroads,'34 of motor car
finance companies, 3 ' dentists, optometrists and similar professional men,1
have been sustained in their effort to challenge the validity of a statutory
or administrative regulation of their business. Business men and manu-
facturers have challenged by declaration the constitutionality of statutes
purporting under penalty to prevent them from manufacturing or vending
131. See Shredded Wheat Co. v. City of Elgin, 284 Ill. 339, 120 N. E. 243 (1918),
criticized in BORCHAro, op. cit. supra note 3, at 967. See also Dreiser v. John Lane Co.,
183 App. Div. 773, 171 N. Y. Supp. 605 (1st Dep't 1918). The Supreme Court did nct
come far from approving (a) the necessity for criminal trial tL. test the constitutionality
and construction of the Nebraska Full Train Crew Law, denying a federal injunctitm
against the enforcement of a state law, and (b) the unimaginative policy of the Shrcddcd
Wheat case, by remarking, in Beal v. 'Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 312 U. S. 45, 51
(1941): "If its decision [a state criminal prosecution] should be favorable to respondent
no reason is shown for anticipating further prosecutions. If it were adverse, penalties
in large amount, it is true, might be incurred, but they may well he the ccnsequence
of violations of state law." A similar idea is expressed in Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
63 Sup. Ct 877, 881 (U. S. 1943).
132. See Craig v. Mayor of Town of Gallatin, 163 Tenn. 413, 79 S. NV. (2d) 353
(1935) ; Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckmer, 15,6 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927).
133. See City of Wichita v. Home Cab Co., 141 Kan. 697, 42 P. (2d) 972 (1935);
Johanson v. Winnipeg, 43 Manit. 201, 2 W. NV. R. 329 (1935) (that by-law requiring
age of 21 as condition of taxi-driver's license was invalid; court remarked that plaintiff
need not submit to prosecution to determine if law is valid. And even though police
chief still had discretion to refuse license on grounds of character, this judgment re-
moved one obstacle).
134. See City of Harrodsburg v. Southern Ry., 278 Ky. 10, 123 S. W. (2d) 233
(1939) (declaration plus injunction against prosecution for violation of ordinance gov-
erning safety devices at intersections, on ground that the ordinance had been repealed).
135. See Nelsen v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N. W. 3'S8 (1939) (regulations claimed
invalid and inapplicable).
136. See Board of Cosmetological Examiners v. Gibbons, 238 Ala. 612, 193 So. 116
(1940) (whether Act applies to petitioner who vends cosmetics at retail); State v.
Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P. (2d) 757 (1938) (course of conduct by dentist claimed privi-
leged); Stewart v. Robertson, 45 Ariz. 143, 40 P. (2d) 979 (1935) (application of
Pharmacy Act); Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 Ad. 195 (1935) (rule
prohibiting optometrists from advertising the prices of optical goods under the name of
opticians).
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certain articles or conducting their business in certain ways 13' or restrict-
ing in certain particulars their liberty in carrying on their business."'
Taxing and Zoning Statutes. Tax statutes generally carry a penalty.
Those who, after threat of prosecution, contest their subjection to the
statute or claim some immunity from its incidence by reason of a disputed
method of computation, classification or deduction, have had no diffi-
culty in having a court pass upon the issue by declaration without exposure
to the obloquy of a criminal trial. 3 ' In the well-known case of Socony-
137. See Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927) (privileged to carry
cigarette advertisements) ; Calcutt v. McGeachy, Sheriff, 213 N. C. 1, 195 S. E. 49
(1938) (prohibiting slot machines; 11 types of machines held within the Act, one type
excluded); League for Preservation of Civil Liberties v. Cincinnati, 29 Ohio Abs. 204
(1939), appeal dismissed, 136 Ohio St. 561, 27 N.E. (2d) 235 (1940) (ordinance atthor-
izing police to seize and destroy alleged gambling devices held invalid) ; Lagoon Jockey
Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405, 270 Pac. 543 (1928) (privileged to conduct races,
because second law repealed and first alleged not revived) ; Utah State Fair Ass'n v.
Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926) (privileged to conduct horse racing without
danger of prosecution); Harcourt v. Attorney General, [1923] N. Z. 686 (that plain-
tiff's scheme for conducting horse races was privileged under the Gaming Act). See
also Smith v. Kairanga County, [1917] N. Z. 567, and Australian Mut. Provident So-
ciety v. Attorney General, [1916] N. Z. 179, discussed in BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note
3, at 972.
138. See Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 (1939) (regulation of tobacco auctions under
Tobacco Inspection Act) ; Sandelin v. Collins, I Cal. (2d) 147, 33 P. (2d) 1009 (1934)
(manner of conducting liquor business claimed privileged) ; McCulley v. City of Wi-
chita, 151 Kan. 214, 98 P. (2d) 192 (1940) (restriction on grocery sales to certain
hours) ; Woolf v. Fuller, 87 N. H. 64, 174 At. 193 (1934) (plaintiff's business claimed
exempt from license; injunction denied, but declaration recommended by court; "pres-
ent legal right" not to be prosecuted) ; Chung Mee Restaurant Co. v. Healy, 86 N. H.
483, 171 Atl. 263 (1934) (privileged to conduct restaurant in certain way without a
license); Path6 Exchange v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 661 (3rd Dep't
1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539, 143 N. E. 274 (1923) (that plaintiff not subject to censorship
law); American Trust Co. v, McCallister, 136 Ore. 338, 299 Pac. 319 (1931) (plaintiff
claimed exemption from the Blue Sky laws and not required to obtain a permit) ; Stet-
zer v. Chippewa County, 225 Wis. 126, 273 N. W. 525 (1937) (applicability of order to
plaintiff's business). See also Ellingwood, Declaratory Judgments in Public Law (1934)
29 ILL. L. REv. 1, 174, 208 et seq.
Mr. Justice Jackson, in his recent book, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPgrM-
AcY (1941) 302 et seq., makes a strong argument for the necessity of declaratory judg-
ments in constitutional cases.
139. See Curry v. Feld, 238 Ala. 255, 190 So. 88 (1939) (seller of cigarettes arrest-
ed; claimed by declaration and injunction immunity from prosecution because engaged
in interstate commerce); City of Mayfield v. Reed, 278 Ky. 5, 127 S. W. (2d) 847
(1939) (exemption from prosecution claimed because accountant not "carrying on busi-
ness" in the city) ; Maloney Davidson Co. v. Martin, 274 Ky. 449, 118 S. W. (2d) 708
(1938) (held, plaintiff's type of wholesale selling was not within purview of stamp tax
statute) ; Detroit Edison Co. v. Secretary of State, 281 Mich. 428, 275 N. W. 196 (1937)
(that plaintiff's offices and branches were not chain stores, within tax statute) : Tirrell
v. Johnston, Atty. Gen., 86 N. H. 530, 171 Ati. 641 (1934), aft'd, 293 U. S. 533 (1934)
[Vol. 52: 445
CHALLENGING "PENAL" STATUTES
Vacuum Oil Company v. City of New York,14 0 sellers of gasoline success-
fully sought a declaration of the city's disability to demand that they exact
the sales tax from their customers upon the entire selling price of the gaso-
line, which included federal and state taxes, and of their privilege, con-
trary to the city local law, to levy the tax on the net price only. While
denying a requested injunction but granting a declaration, Justice Dore,
for a unanimous Appellate Division, remarked:
"For these reasons, and because of the position of peril in which
plaintiffs are placed, in view of the civil and criminal penalties im-
posed if they fail in their designated duties, and to avoid a multi-
plicity of suits and circuity of action, and because of the invalidity
of the regulation so far as it is attacked, we consider that a declara-
tory judgment is the appropriate remedy to settle these controver-
sies before they lead to the repudiation of obligations, the invasiun
of rights, or the commission of wrongs." 141
In a recent Arizona case, the taxpayer had made a settlement with
the state of a disputed claim for taxes and was then met by an additional
demand for penalties because of delay in payment. The taxpayer was
sustained in its action for a declaration that it was not subject to pen-
alties.1'2
Persons desiring to erect buildings alleged to violate zoning ordinances
have sought declarations that the zoning ordinance was arbitrary and
invalid or that their proposed building was not a violation.'
Gambling. The New York Court of Appeals in Reed v. Littleton 141
seems to have found no difficulty in concluding that the issue of constitu-
tionality, or even the claim of the privilege to act free from a governmental
requirement like a license, was properly justiciable by declaratory judg-
ment. Possibly they might even have permitted the legality of a fixed
(injunction, for which court substituted a declaratory judgment, that plaintiff as federal
mail carrier exempt from state gasoline road toll). But in New York Rapid Transit
Corp. v. City of New York, 253 App. Div. 923, 2 N.Y. S. (2d) 659 (2nd Dep't 1938),
a declaration of the legality of penalties imposed for failure to pay certain taxes was
refused. In Stockman v. Wilson Distilling Co., 175 Misc. 314, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 510 (Sup.
Ct 1940), the court declined to declare the invalidity of certain price-maintenance trade
agreements. That plaintiff thereby sought to avoid prosecution wvas no ground fur
refusal; that the issue would not have been settled, because competing retailers might
still sue, may have been a better ground.
140. 247 App. Div. 163, 287 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1st Dep't 1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y.
668, 5 N. E. (2d) 385 (1936).
141. Id. at 167, 287 N. Y. S. at 293.
142. See Peterson v. Central Arizona L. & P. Co., 56 Ariz. 231, 107 P. (2d) 205
(1940).
143. See Moore v. City of Pratt, 148 Kan. 53, 79 P. (2d) 871 (1938) ; C. K. Eddy &
Sons v. Tierney, 276 Mich. 333, 267 N. W. 852 (1936).
144. 275 N. Y. 150, 9 N. E. (2d) 814 (1937).
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business practice within the meaning of a statute, requiring both the de-
termination of the facts of the practice and the construction and interpre-
tation of the law, to be adjudicated. 145 But they drew the line at author-
izing the Appellate Division to determine whether a certain manner of
running dog races constituted "gambling" within the meaning of the anti-
gambling law, although the District Attorney was as anxious as the
operator to obtain the judgment of a court of record, since a criminal
prosecution, though advised by the court, was actually impractical. 1'0
The effort to devise schemes to circumvent or avoid the anti-gambling law,
while meeting a public demand, has induced injunctive and declaratory
challenges to the enforcement of the laws concerning horse racing, dog
racing, slot machines, pin ball games and other devices. Courts in general
have not been especially hesitant about assuming equitable jurisdiction,
granting the injunction where the device or machine was considered as
not to constitute gambling, while denying the injunction when they thought
that it did.
147
Since these businesses come closer to the border line of inala in se, sev-
eral courts have taken the position that they would not by injunction or
declaration of the validity or legality of the device interfere with the
enforcement of the criminal law, even though the court was competent
145. See New York Foreign Trade Zone Operators v. State Liquor Authority,
285 N. Y. 272, 34 N. E. (2d) 316 (1941); Rockland Power & Light Co. v. City of
New York, 289 N. Y. 45, 43 N. E. (2d) 803 (1942).
146. The court did not state fully the historical facts concerning this litigation, which
had resulted in an acquittal for a misdeameanor. This could not be appealed to a court
of record. Commentators on the case also failed to note the peculiar judicial history of
the Reed case, because the appellate division and the court of appeals failed to point
it out. Cf. (1937) 6 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 472; (1938) 23 CORN. L. Q. 314; (1937) 22 MINXN.
L. Rav. 279; (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. REv. 398; (1937) 11 ST. JoHNS L. Rav. 320; (1939)
12 So. CALIF. L. REv. 319. Several of these commentators conclude that the discretion
of the New York courts should have been used in favor of issuing a declaration in the
instant case. Subsequent to the court of appeals' refusal to make a declaration, a federal
injunction was procured in the United States district court restraining the District
Attorney from interfering in the operations of Reed; this was reversed by the circuit
court of appeals, without any decision on the question whether the operations consti-
tuted gambling. Then a criminal indictment was found in the county court and onl the
evidence the county judge dismissed the indictment on motion, without passing on the
question of gambling. The District Attorney appealed to the appellate division, which
declined to entertain the appeal, and this was affirmed by the court of appeals, all with-
out any definite adjudication whether the plan constituted gambling. People v. Reed,
276 N. Y. 5, 11 N. E. (2d) 330 (1937), aff'g, 252 App. Div. 214, 298 N. Y. Supp. 624
(2nd Dep't 1937), motion denied, 276 N.Y. 556, 12 N. E. (2d) 572 (1937). See also
State ex rel. Egan v. Superior Court of Lake County, 211 Ind. 303, 6 N. E. (2d) 945
(1937) (same view as in Reed v. Littleton, 275 N. Y. 150, 9 N. E. (2d) 814 (1937).
Cf. Witschner v. City of Atchison, 154 Kan. 212, 117 P. 570 (1941) (pinball game;
dismissed for inadequacy of record, evidence and controversy-device not yet introduced
in Atchison).
147. See cases cited in BoRcEIARD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1031. Also Comment
(1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 560.
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to pass upon the scheme and would have to do so later on possible appeal
from a criminal conviction. To sustain their disinclination to rule on the
issue of legality in a civil suit, these courts have adduced old generaliza-
tions, such as the refusal of equity to enjoin a criminal prosecution, which
are neither accurate nor followed in many cases by the very courts which
uncritically gave expression to the maxims. What they should say in such
cases is that the facts are too complicated, or that the motive is too un-
certain, to try the issue without a jury-although equity can impanel one
-but not that the general rules of equity disable the court from passing
on the issue of legality.
Business Practices Affected by Police Poweer. In ordinary cases of police
power statutes carrying a penalty, the suggestion of the New York Court
of Appeals in Reed v. Littleton 1" that equity cannot determine whether
certain or uncertain facts constitute "crime"-making an analogy to lar-
ceny or bigamy-is inapplicable. The belief that the decision would not
be binding as res judicata or even as stare decisis is not sustained by ex-
perience, since criminal prosecutions after a declaration of the legality
or meaning of a police power statute are not known to the writer. The
government as a rule is as desirous of having an authoritative construc-
tion of the law as the citizen. Of course the judgment would not be bind-
ing if the facts were varied. Actually the petitioner in these cases relieves
the District Attorney of a burden he would ordinarily have to bear-
petitioner must prove his claim of privilege or immunity by a preponder-
ance of evidence, whereas had the District Attorney prosecuted, he would
have had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Courts of equity have found no difficulty in issuing declarations on
behalf of entitled petitioners against the District Attorney or prosecuting
officer that numerous practices or forms of carrying on business were not
illegal, as claimed, but rather were privileged under the law. Thus mem-
bers of a spiritualist church successfully brought an action against the
county prosecuting officer for a declaration that they were privileged to
worship in the form of seances for which they charged a fee and were
not guilty of violating the statute forbidding public exhibitions of"hyp-
notism, mesmerism, animal magnetism, or so-called psychical forces, for
gain." 149
148. 275 N. Y. 150, at 157, 9 N. E. (2d) 814, at 817. There was no possibility,
as the court remarked, of "interfering with administrative discretion in the enforcement
of law," for the District Attorney joined in the request for a declaration on the very
ground that no criminal prosecution was practical. Perhaps a better support for the
Reed opinion than the reasons adduced might be the fact that the question whether
the device of the plaintiff was "gambling" depended on his intent, and that could
have been referred to a jury on interrogatories in the appellate division or should be
left to the determination of a criminal jury, however impractical in the Reed case.
149. See Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N. NV. 62 (1940). See also cases dis-
cussed and cited in BoRcuAnm, op. cit. supra note 3, at 779 el seq., 783 ct seq., 966 ct seq.
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Business men have had occasion to place in issue by declaratory action
their privilege to continue in the liquor business because a local option
law had not properly come into force, 5" to sell used cars free from any
penalty or fee arising out of the failure of former owners to pay license
taxes,'' and their claims that a certain rider attached to an insurance
policy was privileged, in spite of defendant's threatened prosecution,",-
that a certain method of dental advertising was not a violation of the
statute against theuse of corporate or trade names,"" that a dentist was
privileged to substitute for the administration of anesthetics a duly regis-
tered nurse for a physician,' 54 that the distribution of milk in cardboard
containers was not a violation of an ordinance prescribing distribution
in bottles only,"'a that the manner in which the petitioners conducted horse
races was not unlawful as the District Attorney claimed.'
Lotteries. On several occasions enterprising business men have sought
to obtain a judicial declaration that their schemes for increasing business
by distributing benefits to the successful winners of guessing or other
contests based on chance were not lotteries which would expose them to
criminal prosecution." 7 This required the court to examine the details of
the schemes to determine whether they fell within the ban of the general
term "lottery."
150. See Rogers v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 679, 99 S. W. (2d) 781 (1936). See
also Hemenway & Moser Co. v. Funk (State Liquor Comm'n), 100 Utah 72, 106 P.
(2d) 779 (1940) (power to seize personalty for violation of liquor law). Cf. Ellingwood,
supra note 138, at 204 et seq.
151. See Henry, Commissioner of Licenses y. Drennen Motor Car Co., 235 Ala. 559,
180 So. 563 (1938).
152. See General Insurance Co. v. Ham, State Ins. Comm'r, 49 Wyo. 525, 57 P. (2d)
671 (1936) (commissioner held to have discretion).
153. See Gullings v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 200 Minn. 115, 273 N. W.
703 (1937). Cf. Speert v. Morgenthau, 116 F. (2d) 301 (App. D. C. 1940) (privileged
to label their whiskey either "corn" or "bourbon" against claim contra of Alcohol Ad-
ministrator).
154. See State v. Borah, 51 Ariz. 318, 76 P. (2d) 757 (1938). Cf. Board of Cos-
metological Examiners v. Gibbons, 238 Ala. 612, 193 So. 116 (1940) (that Act was not
applicable to petitioners who vend cosmetics at retail).
155. See Fieldcrest- Dairies v. City of Chicago, 35 F. Supp. 451 (N. D. Ill. 1940),
rev'd, 122 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941), vacated and remanded, 316 U. S. 168 (1942).
156. See Multnomah County Fair Ass'n v. Langley, Dist.-Atty., 140 Ore. 172, 13 P.
(2d) 354 (1932). The District Attorney had claimed that the method of rewarding the
owners of horses and the winners was a nuisance and a lottery, under statute. Cf. cases
cited supra note 137.
157. See Worden v. City of Louisville, 279 Ky. 712, 131 S. W. (2d) 923 (1939) (pro-
posed plan; held, for defendant, because prosecuting attorney not joined as defendant);
McFadden v. Bain, Dist. Atty., 162 Ore. 250, 91 P. (2d) 292 (1939) (coupons with
theater tickets, entitling holder to participate in raffle). See note 137 supra. In Brown
v. Bonnycastle, [1936] 1 D. L. R. 295 (Man.) an informer unsuccessfully sued defend-
ants, winners of lottery on car, for forfeiture of car, because lottery illegal.
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Of equal interest is the attempt of an individual or a co~perative group
to demonstrate against the prosecuting officials that their business is not
"insurance" or other fiduciary business subject to strict regulation, for
which reason they claim exemption from the restriction or penalties im-
posed. 5s
Unlawful Practice of Law. When the Bar Association of Richmund
accused the Credit M2%en's Association of that city of engaging unlawfully
in the practice of law, the latter instituted an action for a declaration that
their system of collecting accounts was legitimate and not a violation of
the statute."5 9 A similar practice was recently sustained by the Supreme
Court of Missouri in a well-reasoned opinion on the demand of numerous
casualty insurance companies which had been charged with the unlawful
practice of law through their lay adjusters in the investigation and settle-
ment of claims against the company.Y00 The court remarked that the
criminal features of the case were of less importance than the private and
public interest in establishing the legitimacy of business conduct and prac-
tices, and that there was no reason why a civil equity court could not make
that determination. The court made a classification of the numerous types
of activity involved, holding some privileged and others unlawful.
158. See Moresh v. O'Regan, County Prosecutor, 120 N. J. Eq. 534, 187 Atl. 619
(1936), and the extraordinary subsequent miscarriage of justice in this case due to the
New Jersey division between law and equity; BoncHAn, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1023. Cf.
Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D. D. C. 1938), in which Justice Bailey
declared that the Association was not engaged in the "business of insurance" and hence
was not violating the criminal law. Judgment affirmed in Jordan v. Group Health
Ass'n, 107 F. (2d) 239 (App. D. C. 1939).
159. See Richmond Ass'n of Credit MN~en v. Bar Ass'n of City of Riclim',nd, 167 Va.
327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937). But the practice of the Association in selecting attorneys to
make collections for customers and fixing fees, and sharing fees without the customer's
knowledge of the identity of the attorneys, was considered the practice of law. CI. (1939)
52 HA.v. L. Rnv 1185.
160. See Liberty fut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S. NV. (2d) 945 (1939).
In Birmingham Bar Ass'n v. Phillips & 'Marsh, 239 Ala. 650, 196 So. 725 (1940), a
case practically similar to the Libcrly Mutual case in Missouri, Judge Bouldin for the
Alabama court, which has been liberal in the use of the declaratory judgment, concluded
that quo warranto was the "e-clusive remedy" for such problems. This seems uncon-
vincing and under the terms of the Uniform Act hardly justified. The court also thought
the three classes of defendant's claims adjusters, their employees, and accessiry defend-
ants such as insurance companies, had nothing in common and therefore could not b-
joined, but this view also seems outmoded. See BonC.anD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 23.
In LaVelle v. Hennepin County Bar Ass'n, 206 Minn. 290, 283 N.W. 783 (1939), a
private member challenged by declaration the defendant's right to poll the members of
the association to elicit their preference for judicial candidates, on the ground that this
violated the corrupt practices act. Demurrer on the merits was sustained.
In Gonzales v. Ito, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 124, 55 P. (2d) 262 (1936), a landowner chal-
lenged defendant's (Japanese) power to purchase at foreclosure on alleged ground that
this violated the alien land law. Held, for defendant.
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We have already observed that the New York Court of Appeals thought
it sound policy to determine by declaration that the New York Foreign
Trade Zone Operators by adding water to certain imported liquor were
not engaged in the practice of "rectification" and were therefore exempt
from the claimed obligation of taking out a state distiller's license.101
By contrast, the refusal of an Indiana court to determine by declaration
whether the Kroger Grocery in selling certain vitamin tablets was engaged
in selling "food" or "drugs" was most unfortunate, since this was not a
case for criminal prosecution, as the court seemed to think.10
2
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this article will have demonstrated:
(1) That the declaration is superior to the injunction as a vehicle of
adjudicating the construction and constitutionality of police power stat-
utes, ordinances and regulations;
(2) That the injunction has become an awkward tool and has been
abused, having been granted in many cases in the absence of the justifying
conditions and refused in many cases where it should have been granted,
a refusal due to considerations adverse to federal interference with state
proceedings and to considerations involved in the cloudy maxim of not
interfering with "criminal" prosecutions;
(3) That by progressively advancing restrictions on the grant of in-
junction, the courts are driving litigants into the position of either aban-
doning their challenge and obeying an unconstitutional statute, or else
becoming, by choice or necessity, defendants in criminal trials; if courts
must restrict the injunction, the alternative is not a criminal trial but a
declaratory judgment;
(4) That the judicial demand for a "personal" threat of prosecution
by an enforcing officer is an improper condition of justiciability, since
jeopardy creates the privilege of initiating an action for relief, declara-
tory or equitable, and jeopardy is usually created by the statute itself, not
by the Attorney-General or District Attorney;
(5) That the rationalization of Ex parte Young, which led the courts
into their present bog, should be officially repudiated as unnecessary and
confusing and without justification;
(6) That the perpetuation of the misconception in Ex parte La Prade
and Federal Rule 25 (d) based upon it should also be officially repudi-
ated;
161. It is regrettable that three judges dissented, since this is an admirable example
of.the declaratory judgment procedure. To compel the operators to become defendants
in a criminal trial is no "adequate remedy," as Judge Desmond pointed out, even if that
contention had any relevancy to the issue. It has not. See note 61 supra.
162. See Dep't of State v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 46 N. E. (2d) 237
(Ind. 1943).
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(7) That the broad conception of "crimes" and "criminal" law should
be analyzed and broken down, and police power measures carrying a pen-
alty should no longer be classified as "crimes" or exposed to the same
methods of adjudication as crimes;
(8) That on the contrary, the victim, target or subject of these police
power measures should be enabled to challenge their constitutionality,
applicability and construction by the simple method of declaratory adjudi-
cation, and thus dissipate the mass of judicial detritus which has accumu-
lated around the adjudication of legislative prescriptions and so largely
frustrated an efficient administration of justice.
